

# Control Culture

## Foucault and Deleuze after Discipline

Edited by Frida Beckman

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# Introduction: Control of What?

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*Frida Beckman*

**T**he world', Gilles Deleuze says in a conversation with Antonio Negri in the spring of 1990, has 'been taken from us'. It has been taken from us because we have lost our belief in it and without belief, we have closed down the potential to spawn 'new space-times', to make space for even the most modest events that evade control (Deleuze 1995: 176). Strikingly, but not unusually within the framework of Deleuze's oeuvre and in particular within his more political writings, this statement is at once bleak and constructive. In the same breath as it states that we have lost belief and thus the world, it offers at least the beginning of a suggestion of how to regain it. Deleuze notes the loss of belief but also reminds us that if we could only summon up the tiniest bit of it, this would enable us to 'precipitate events' and engender 'new space-times, however small their surface or volume' (Deleuze 1995: 176). Art plays a crucial part in such claims to hope. As he writes in his second cinema book; exactly because the world has turned into 'a bad cinema, in which we no longer believe', true cinema may be able to help us restore 'our belief in the world' (Deleuze 2013: 187). It is now three decades since Deleuze started flagging questions of control – in presentations such as 'Having an Idea in Cinema/What is a Creative Act?' in 1987 and 'What is a Dispositif?' in 1988, the conversation between Deleuze and Antonio Negri entitled 'Control and Becoming', published in *Futur Antérieur* in 1990, which is also the same year in which Deleuze's short but seminal article 'Postscript on Control Societies' was first published in *L'Autre Journal*. During the decades that have passed since then, the shifts away from disciplinary society that Michel Foucault had already predicted and that Deleuze articulated in these brief engagements have escalated in ways and on a scale that neither of them could have possibly imagined. So what is the status of our belief today? And what is the role of artistic and cultural expression in relation to it?

When Foucault stated in one of his lectures at Collège de France in 1979 that ‘control is no longer just the counterweight to freedom, as in the case of panopticism: it becomes its mainspring’ (Foucault 2008: 67) and Deleuze pointed to ‘the widespread progressive introduction of a new system of domination’ based on continuous modulations and codes in 1990 (Deleuze 1995: 182), few would have imagined that it would be possible, and, indeed, common practice to trace people’s movements with the help of their smartphones, or that people would voluntarily wear watches that monitor the nature of their physical activities during the day and every minute of their sleep during the night, or that social media would use algorithms to individualise not only advertisements but also information and political messages. Perhaps few would also have been able to imagine a speed of technological development which makes you realise that even as you write down the most recent examples in a book manuscript, they will most likely already seem out of date once the book is published. But even if they could not, of course, foresee the details or speed of this development, Foucault and Deleuze, did, it seems, in some sense pre-empt the conditions that would enable such technologies to flourish, the transformative effects this would have on disciplinary modes of power, the accelerating consequences on the continued development of biopolitics, and the ensuing emergence of the complexities of control society.

There will be reason, in this introduction as well as in the various chapters of this book, to revisit and reevaluate Foucault’s and Deleuze’s theories of discipline and control in the light of these more recent developments. Indeed, and while Deleuze’s conception of control constitutes a key starting point for this volume, this conception should be considered as a necessarily specific and historical attempt to map an emerging *dispositif*. A *dispositif*, in brief, and as Deleuze traces it via Foucault, is ‘a tangle’, a composition of lines of different nature, lines that ‘do not just make up the social apparatus but run through it and pull at it’ (Deleuze 1992b: 159). A *dispositif* shapes visibility, enunciation, knowledge, subjects, a *dispositif* is made up of concrete, if always potentially transformable components, a *dispositif* constitutes a machine ‘which make[s] one see and speak’ (Deleuze 1992b: 160). Working with the notion of the *dispositif* is a way of acknowledging the specific components and coordinates of power at any one time while simultaneously recognising how such components and coordinates are variable and also invariably under transformation. ‘In each apparatus [*dispositif*], as Deleuze puts it, ‘it is necessary to distinguish what we are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming’ (Deleuze 1992b: 164). Underlined here, and this takes us back to the ‘new space–times’ that Deleuze hopes we will summon up in the face of control, each *dispositif* should be assessed also in its ability to ‘break down’ and make way for ‘a future apparatus’. It may be possible to trace ‘paths of creation, which are continually aborting, but then

restarting, in a modified way, until the former apparatus is broken' (Deleuze 1992b: 163–4).

However, and while a *dispositif* necessarily builds on variable lines and coordinates, these lines and coordinates may be hard, rigid and solid and thus difficult to break (Deleuze 1992b: 164). And at the moment, control, in all its suppleness, seems increasingly hard, rigid and solid. Perhaps it is because of its all-encompassing tendencies that we are struggling to envision its breaking point, perhaps it is because neither Foucault nor Deleuze lived long enough to develop their theories or to respond to the conditions they pre-empted, but it may also be because we are too close to it – because we are as yet unable to 'distinguish what we are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming'. But exactly because of these concerns, it seems important to map and interrogate some of those lines and paths. 'Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it', Deleuze writes in his 'Postscript', 'has to be assessed at the level of our every move' (Deleuze 1995: 176). This is what this volume hopes to do, or at least aspires towards. It aims high as it hopes to contribute to ways of assessing our submission to control as well as our ability to resist it across a large number of discourses and modes of expression. It hopes to be able to do so, not just by discussing and identifying control mechanisms more generally but also, and more specifically, by examining the specificities of a broad range of cultural expression and the ways in which control functions or is resisted in different modes and media.

The chapters in this volume explore control in relation to philosophy, music, cinema, television, contemporary fiction, the history of the novel, early modern essayist traditions, poetry and digital technologies, and they offer a number of unique takes on what the various modulations of control might look like as actualised through differing formal, generic and contextual conditions. On the one hand they look at how in control society 'nothing's left alone for long', and on the other at how different modes of expression construct what Deleuze calls 'war-machines', that is 'a particular way of occupying, taking up, space–time, or inventing new space–times' (Deleuze 1995: 175, 172). This way, the chapters simultaneously contribute to more area-specific studies pertaining to the particular status of different disciplines in the present and to analyses that broaden, deepen, historicise, actualise and problematise conceptions of control. Control can and has been conceptualised in many ways and the different contributors will interrogate or expand on different facets of this concept. The conception of control that is most central to the book as a whole is that which emerges from Foucault and Deleuze so, first, let me just briefly outline these core ideas.

Deleuze begins his 'Postscript' with Foucault and an outline of the way the latter theorises the logic of disciplinary societies. Succeeding sovereign societies, discipline as a mode of political control relies on spaces of enclosure,

that is on institutions such as the prison, the hospital, the asylum, the factory, the school and the family. The individual passes from one to the other and is claimed and moulded by their laws and regulations. This logic dominated during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it peaked at the beginning of the twentieth century, and its demise accelerated after World War II. After this point, Deleuze suggests, institutions like these have come into crisis. Indeed, they are finished, he suggests, ‘whatever the length of their expiration periods’ (Deleuze 1992a: 4). In their place has emerged a different order of power – that which he calls ‘societies of control’. William Burroughs is identified as the one naming this ‘new monster’ control and Paul Virilio is recognised as an early theorist of its free-floating nature. One of the key features of control society as Deleuze theorises it is the instant but continuous adjustment and manipulation of affect that makes the arduous disciplining of the subject moving from one institution to the next increasingly redundant:

In disciplinary societies you were always starting all over again (as you went from school to barracks, from barracks to factory), while in control societies you never finish anything – business, training, and military service being coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of universal transmutation. (Deleuze 1995: 179)

This form of power is faster and freer – it does not depend on institutions and on moulding individuals according to their norms, but on the constant modulation and coding of affects and desires.

What emerges in the place of the long-term training of the individual body in disciplinary society is, Deleuze suggests, the ‘dividual’ of control society, that is parts of selves, affects, desires, which are identified, addressed and controlled by means of samples and data. Deleuze illuminates the differences between different types of power with the help of machines. Sovereign societies relied on simple machines such as levers and clocks, disciplinary society on machines of energy and production, and control societies on computers. This most recent stage is largely a move from the analogical to the digital. ‘The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner – state or private power – but coded figures – deformable and transformable – of a single corporation that now has only stockholders’ (Deleuze 1992a: 6). This is also intimately related to geopolitical developments and globalisation as the machines of production have largely been relegated to the Third World. It is in the West, then, that the crisis of institutions has paved way for ‘a new system of domination’ (Deleuze 1992a: 7).

Several of the chapters in this volume quarrel with or extend Deleuze’s conception of control. Concerns include its historical or conceptual relation to



Foucault's understanding of discipline, ways in which either or both of these concepts have been deployed by later critics, or dimensions of control that have remained un- or underexplored. This includes Gregg Lambert – who questions the usefulness of Deleuze's concept and its powerful influence on theories of biopolitics, Seb Franklin – who suggests that our understanding of the relation between discipline and control needs to be broadened beyond its common historical and Western applications, Carin Franzén – who discovers links between the control and the libertine art practices of sovereign societies, Neel Ahuja – who provides a conceptualisation of control and race, and Cary Wolfe – who questions not so much Foucault as Wendy Brown's recent and influential critique of his work. Other chapters explore or deploy the concepts of discipline and control in trying to understand recent developments in different cultural modes of expression. Thus, Jeffrey T. Nealon analyses the changing function of popular music in relation to control over the decades since the 1960s, Paul Patton explores the fate of philosophy as a discipline in an increasingly neoliberal university, Gregory Flaxman investigates contemporary cinematic dreams of escaping 'off the grid', Colin Gardner looks at surveillance and control strategies in television, Colleen Glenney Boggs explores how control is increasingly control without an object, and my own chapter investigates ways in which the novel form may be challenged by control mechanisms.

But, and possibly with Lambert as an exception, these contributors ultimately want to develop rather than dismiss Deleuze's concept. None of them takes the stronger stance of Mark G. E. Kelly, who argues that Deleuze misinterprets Foucault's conception of discipline (Kelly 2015: 151). While acknowledging that the power structures of society have continued to develop and that Foucault himself identified a 'shift in forms of power from repression of bodies to a looser control', Kelly insists that such a shift does not fundamentally change the nature or essence of the regime of discipline (Kelly 2015: 151–3). Contemporary neoliberalism may be 'less disciplinary' in the sense that direct state interventions have decreased but the governing of human behaviour that is more prominent is still about discipline, be it 'at the level of enterprises' (Kelly 2015: 154). For Kelly, then, the shifts that Deleuze discusses must be understood in terms of a shift in intensity rather than in type (Kelly 2015: 154) – it is not a matter of a new power technology but of changing relations 'within disciplinary, biopolitical capitalism' (Kelly 2015: 162). I'm not sure, however, that Deleuze or most of those taking on his control concept insist that the transition does imply the former. Indeed, Deleuze speaks of 'modulations' of forms of power for a very specific reason. An alternative here may be to, like Lambert, see Deleuze's conception of control as a 'mutation' of Foucauldian theory.

Some contributors to this volume make use of the notion of the diagram as it has been developed by Foucault and Deleuze as it is helpful when discussing

whether the shift between discipline and control should be understood in terms of essences or intensification. The Foucauldian notion of the diagram, which recurs in Deleuze's work, not least in his book on Foucault, outlines generalisable, abstract functions and is useful when outlining transitions and distinctions between different dispositifs. More specifically, the diagram helps us map, abstractly, the specific functions of different societies. Thus, and as we have already learned above, in the diagram of disciplinary society we can include spatiotemporal stability, institutions, individuals and analogical machines, while the diagram of control comprises abstract fluidity, codes, individuals and digitality. Many more dimensions can be included in these diagrams, of course, and the different chapters of this book will help identify also the more discreet dimensions of the diagram of control society or, as is the case of Lambert's chapter, help us problematise the distinction that Deleuze makes between disciplinary- and control society in the first place. Another of the contributors to this volume, Gregory Flaxman, has argued, although not in his chapter here, that a crucial difference between the diagrams of discipline and control is that while the former still seems to include the possibility for interpretation to retrieve hidden meanings, the latter offers no such possibility because 'its diagram is never concealed' (Flaxman 2012: 283). To do something more than to illuminate the workings of the diagram itself, Deleuze thus needs to introduce an element that, while immanent to the logic, offers the potential for change. In this light, Deleuze's reliance on an element from science fiction, namely the feature of the future, or the outside, which Lambert quarrels with, is arguably an element that emerges with Deleuze's ambition to incorporate, in the diagram of control, a potential for resistance.

However, and although Deleuze suggests in his 'Postscript' that we need not fear or hope, 'but only to look for new weapons' (Deleuze 1992a: 4) and he does end this essay with the question of resistance, the piece ultimately does little more than outline what he sees as some key differences between discipline and control. In his conversation with Negri, several of these key points are rehearsed but here is developed at least a little more concretely what he sees as essential to a political analysis of the present. Referring back to his and Félix Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, he points to the three main directions it takes when thinking about the analysis of capitalism: the mapping and analysis of the lines of flight that characterise any society, the consideration of minorities, that is being – or rather becoming – without a model, and the characterisation of 'war machines', which 'have nothing to do with war but to do with a particular way of occupying, taking up, space–time, or inventing new space–times: revolutionary movements' (Deleuze 1995: 171–2). In the conversation with Negri, he also picks up Henri Bergson's conception of fabulation and suggests that we ought to 'give it political meaning' (Deleuze 1995: 174). Furthermore, he develops his attention to the relation between communication and control that

he mentions in the 'Postscript' and states that we need to 'hijack speech'. Creating, he goes on to argue in a truly Burroughsian vein, 'has always been something different from communicating. The key may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control' (Deleuze 1995: 175). What matters, he says towards the end, is the 'real rebellious spontaneity' that may only emerge for a moment and then become part of new forms of knowledge and power, but that engender new space-times that keep us thinking and believing (Deleuze 1995: 176).

Art, Deleuze indicates in 'Having an Idea in Cinema' (1998) – that is, in the third piece in which he explicitly talks about control society – provides such spaces. In this essay, he articulates more directly his understanding of the relation between control, communication and art. Art is not about communication, he argues, in fact, he suggests, it has 'nothing to do with' and 'does not contain the least bit of information'. As such, the work of art has fundamental affinities with the act of resistance, which also needs to be something different from information. Defining information as 'the controlled system of order-words that are used in a given society', Deleuze links this to an emerging control society in which confinement as a control mechanism will be replaced with information that enables a 'free' but nonetheless 'perfectly controlled' movement (Deleuze 1998: 18). In a society where 'information is precisely the system of control' (Deleuze 1998: 17), art harbours resistance and, apart from again referring to the literary example of Burroughs, he also gives examples from music (Schoenberg) and cinema (Straub and Huillet). As these very brief examples suggest – it is a pity that Deleuze never had the chance to explore in more detail how literature, music, cinema, as well as the other arts harbour the power to resist control, although, arguably, he does perform such analysis implicitly in much of his later work – there are many facets to control to be explored in relation to many art forms, a task that the present collection will try to pursue. Such a project is especially important since, and despite Deleuze's pointers to art as a mode of resistance to control, art has not constituted a very common angle in studies of control after Deleuze. There are exceptions, of course. For example, Steven Shaviro uses control as one of the key diagrams of his study of post-cinematic affect (see Shaviro 2010), and Simon O'Sullivan has pursued the question of art practice and resistance and argued that Deleuze's brief control texts offer up 'a veritable arsenal for any practice that might pitch itself against control' (O'Sullivan 2016: 206).

But specific studies of control and cultural expression are far outnumbered by studies of control as related to technology and digitisation. And of course, technology does play a fundamental role in developments in and concepts of control. Deleuze, as we have seen, recognises this in the 'Postscript'. And, as Eugene Thacker puts it, if 'one is to foster an understanding and awareness of how the social and the political are not external to technology', then 'it is

important to understand how the technological is in some sense isomorphic to the social and political' (Thacker 2004: xii). Thus, we can see how James R. Beniger identifies a 'Control Revolution' taking place around the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century and growing quickly in the US, England, France and Germany. Beniger refers to Max Weber as one of the first theorists to recognise and theorise the need for societal control emerging with the effects of the Industrial Revolution. Weber, of course, and as Beniger notes, analysed bureaucracy, the key technology of control at this time. After World War II, however, computer technology gradually began to take over as the key mode of control (Beniger 1986: 6). Norbert Wiener's 1948 *Cybernetics: Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine* constituted a key starting point for discussions of control in relation to self-regulated systems. Both the systems and the theories have advanced exponentially since Weiner's study and also since Beniger's study from 1986. But they continue to point to the fundamental link that control has to technological developments and in particular to the emergence of cybernetics and digital communications. Studies of control since then have continued to be related to technology and the most common angle on the subject of control in contemporary research is still the interrelation between control, the materiality of technology, and, increasingly, network systems.

'The network', Alexander R. Galloway and Thacker observe in 2007, 'has emerged as a dominant form describing the nature of control today' (Galloway and Thacker 2007: 4). Exploring the materiality of control in network environments, Galloway questions the freedom associated with digital communication and points to hidden control mechanisms and the codes and protocol that enable them. 'Protocol', he argues, 'is to control societies as the panopticon is to disciplinary societies' (Galloway 2004: 13). While Galloway thus underlines Deleuze's prediction of the centrality of computers to the development of control society, Mark Poster points out that although Deleuze refers repeatedly to the importance of computer technology to this development, he is never very specific and clear about this relation. His reliance on Burroughs when discussing information and counter-information illuminates, Poster argues, this lack of grounding in new technologies as these were hardly prevalent in Burroughs' time (Poster 2006: 59–60). Poster therefore finds the term control society as it has or has not been developed after Deleuze unable to fully account for new technologies of power.

Antoinette Rouvroy proposes the concept of 'algorithmic governmentality' to illuminate the workings of contemporary technology and control. Algorithmic governmentality is not reliant on a process of subjectivation; it does not 'need to tame the wilderness of facts and behaviours; nor does it aim at producing docile subjects', in fact it 'carefully avoids any direct confrontation with and impact on flesh and blood persons' (Rouvroy 2013: 157). Instead,

the target of control is ‘a unique, supra-individual, constantly reconfigured “statistical body” made of the infra-individual digital traces of impersonal, disparate, heterogeneous, dividualized facets of daily life and interactions’ (Rouvroy 2013: 157). Similarly, Benjamin H. Bratton argues that the mode of governance emerging with the technologies of the present is increasingly disinterested in human subjects. We no longer deal primarily with ‘the ‘state as a machine’ (Weber) or the ‘state machine’ (Althusser) or really even (only) the technologies of governance (Foucault) as much as it is *the machine as the state*’ (Bratton 2015: 8). Instead, he suggests, we are dealing with a new mode of governance altogether, one whose ‘primary means and interests are not human discourse and human bodies but, rather, the calculation of all the world’s information and of the world itself *as* information’ (Bratton 2015: 8). This means that what is called for, according to Bratton, is no longer only ways of identifying and theorising new functions of the state or the ways new technologies should be governed, but a recognition and theorisation of how technology today comes to ‘absorb functions of the state and the work of governance’ (Bratton 2015: 7). This, of course, has implications for global politics. Closely analysing the processes of network society, Tiziana Terranova sees how it is characterised by information overload, an overload moving across multiple communication channels, while it also moves global culture ‘within a single informational milieu’ (Terranova 2004: 1). While it is possible to see this as a homogenisation of culture additionally under siege by the white noise of continuous information, Terranova argues that the ‘annihilation of distances within an informational milieu’ brings a ‘creative destruction’ and ‘*productive* movement’ that releases rather than inhibits the potential for transformation (Terranova 2004: 2–3).

In the light of such radical developments in technology, some of the projections Deleuze makes (with the help of Guattari), such as the continuous computational tracking and control of city-dwellers, may seem, as Bratton puts it, ‘quaint’. This is not because Deleuze and Guattari were wrong about the continuous modulation enabled by such technologies – indeed Deleuze does identify the increasing importance and role of computational information technology to societies of control – but because such modes are perfectly commonplace today (Bratton 2015: 158). However, Deleuze did, as Luciana Parisi points out, anticipate the convergence between power and the operative realm of control ‘as it constantly works to glue together spatiotemporalities into extended apparatuses of uninterrupted relationality’ (Parisi 2013: 102). As such, Parisi shows, his work can also be quite useful in developing a postcybernetic theory of control. Galloway, Poster, Rouvroy, Bratton and Parisi thus in different ways recognise the importance of, but also the need to continue developing, Deleuze’s control theories in the field of technology.

At the same time, Foucault’s and Deleuze’s concepts are used and

elaborated in attempts to theorise contemporary developments in biopolitics. In an essay published in 1995, that is in the same year as Deleuze's control essays were translated into English, Michael Hardt traces the concept of civil society from Hegel to Gramsci to Foucault. Foucault's disciplinary society, he argues, can be described as civil society seen from below, describing the same society but pointing out the normalisation procedures that inevitably inflect its democratic potentials (Hardt 1995: 33). While thus bringing to this concept a problematised and problematising perspective on democracy, the disciplinary model continues to rely on the constructions of subjects and identities. What makes control society 'postcivil' is, essentially, the new techniques in which the citizen has become rather 'an infinitely flexible placeholder for identity' (Hardt 1995: 40). Control, he argues, 'functions on the plane of the simulacra of society' and the 'whateverness of the societies of control is precisely what gives them their smooth surfaces' (Hardt 1995: 37). In other words, while the diagram of discipline is similar to civil society in that it relies on fixed positions and identities (albeit as its dark underbelly, as I argue in my chapter contribution to this volume), the diagram of control, relying rather on mobility and flexibility, takes us into a postcivil era.

Where Hardt thus employs Deleuze's concept of control to articulate a theory of 'postcivil society', Brian Massumi uses it to theorise a 'capitalist supersystem'. By outlining the relation between command and control, he provides a picture of specificities, interrelations and developments of and between discipline and control. Command and control, Massumi argues, are reciprocal and can never be separated, but the dynamics between them differ depending on the power structures at hand. Thus, the institutions that constitute a central function in disciplinary society can be discussed as 'normative command centers radiating control' whereas control society relies on a 'fine-meshing of command and control', that is its distribution is increasingly independent of such 'centers' (Massumi 1998: 56–7). Here, Massumi also contributes to developing Deleuze's brief pointer to the shift between discipline and control by showing how this shift entails the deregulation of 'normal'. Normality, as a central dimension of the command of a disciplinary system, relies to a large extent on creating a binary normative system positioning deviant elements as oppositional. In control society, however, normality is liberated from such fixed values and becomes free-standing. 'Normativity', he suggests, 'becomes synonymous with collective visibility and social operativity – with living itself' (Massumi 1998: 57). In fact, this is a key characteristic of this developed capitalist system – normality is not coded but is constantly modulated and emerges in effect – the system is 'formally undetermined but gives rise to determinations', it is 'ungrounded yet grounds' (Massumi 1998: 59). In this post-ideological, posthuman era, command and control 'reciprocally generate each other and disappear and reappear into each other following

a complicated and fundamentally unpredictable rhythm covering the totality of social space' (Massumi 1998: 58).

Foucault's and Deleuze's theories also constitute an important starting point for Hardt's and Negri's theorisation of empire during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Through their theories, Hardt and Negri gain the tools to explore 'the material functioning of imperial rule' and develop their analysis of the mechanisms of biopolitical production on a geopolitical scale. Analysing the decline in the power of institutions and autonomy of nation states that has occurred as a result of an increasingly globalised capitalist production, they integrate and develop theories of the transition between discipline and control to account for what they see as 'a new global form of sovereignty' – empire (Hardt and Negri 2000: xii). Biopolitical production is key to this new paradigm, and they understand it as 'the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another' (Hardt and Negri 2000: xiii). Hardt and Negri make a useful comparison between theories of discipline and control and the better-known Marxist theory of the transition between formal and real subsumption and the Frankfurt School development of these theories in relation to culture and social relations. This comparison – which Franklin picks up on in his chapter in the present volume – points to the similarity between the theories, while also emphasising a crucial difference that exists already with Foucault but that becomes more explicit in Deleuze. While the Marxist and Frankfurt School theories of real subsumption rely on unidimensional processes, Foucault and Deleuze bring out the plurality and multiplicity of subsumption. This is an extension of real subsumption beyond its economic and social dimensions to include also 'the social *bios* itself', that is, all dimensions of living and of life itself.

Increasingly also, and here we approach the more direct context of the present collection, control is being theorised or used as a way of understanding the cultural logic of the present. Franklin argues, in his book-length study on the matter, that while the link between digital technologies and control continues to account for a significant amount of its 'conceptual and explanatory power' (Franklin 2015: xiv), it is crucial that we explore control also as a cultural logic. By proposing control as the cultural logic of the present, Franklin finds a Jamesonian way of addressing the problem of periodisation. Jameson, we may recall, resolved the problem of periodising and thereby potentially obliterating the many differences inherent in postmodernism by positioning it as a cultural dominant 'a conception which allows for the presence and coexistence of a range of very different, yet subordinate, features' (Jameson 1991: 4). True to Jameson, Franklin notes that understanding the political implications of a cultural object requires looking not only at the explicitly political in terms of content but also at 'the specific technical objects, economic practices,

industrial formations, political ideals, and organizational diagrams' surrounding it (Franklin 2015: xxii). Thus, for example, he addresses Jameson's classic elaboration on the concept of cognitive mapping in the 1980s as well as Galloway's and Wendy Hui Kyong Chun's problematisation of this method in relation to network culture in the twenty-first century. Franklin wants to develop a model capable also of teasing out the material implications – 'the socioeconomic and cultural costs' – of representation under control. 'The mode of cultural analysis that control necessitates', he writes, 'is thus one that takes the monolithic historical dimension of algorithmic or networked logic [. . .] as inseparable from the formations of sense and subjectivity that produce cultural forms' (Franklin 2015: 99).

Paying close attention to the cultural forms and the cultural logic of control is crucial as what is repeated and underlined in writings on contemporary control is the way in which it implicates itself into every aspect of life and on all levels of being. If disciplinary control still comes with at least some degree of possibility of identifying the locus of power, control has become so subtle and pervasive and so integral to our every move that it has become hard even to identify it. Bernard E. Harcourt suggests that control has become so integrated into our pleasures and desires that we accept it with open arms. Although we are at least vaguely aware of the ways in which our increasingly, and increasingly inescapable, digital existence makes it possible to monitor, mine and profile our behaviour and desires everywhere and all the time, that very immediacy itself – 'the stimulating distractions and sensual pleasures of the new digital age' – sidetracks us from this fact (Harcourt 2015: 3). But it is not the dulling and distracting and forgetting which are the most central mechanisms but rather the ways in which the workings and constituents of our digital life speak to, encourage and manipulate our desires that constitute the key element of contemporary power structures. These power structures, he argues, are different from those of disciplinary society exactly in that there is no real need to enforce discipline or to make a distinction between our regular lives and correctional facilities. Because 'coercive surveillance technology is now woven into the very fabric of our pleasure and fantasies', it has become impossible, today, to separate between pleasure and punish (Harcourt 2015: 21).

Many concepts have been proposed to understand the structure of this new logic. Mentioned here have been Galloway's 'protocol', Rouvroy's 'algorithmic governmentality', Hardt's 'postcivil society', Massumi's 'capitalist super-system', Hardt and Negri's 'empire', and there are also what Harcourt calls 'expository society', Poster the 'superpanopticon', and Bratton 'the Stack'. What these concepts have in common is the sense of the all-encompassing nature of contemporary control. However, they all to a differing extent also stress the importance as well as the possibility of resistance. And importantly, this resistance is necessarily located within control society itself. Massumi



proposes ‘productive interference patterns’ that introduce excess, deficiency, humour – anything that does not resonate with this system. For Hardt, it is essential that we investigate the ways in which the form as well as the very nature of labour but also of social practices has changed, in order to identify ‘the germs for a new movement, with new forms of contestation and new conceptions of liberation’ (Hardt 1995: 41). Galloway sees how the regime of control through protocol requires abandoning any ambition to transcend the immanent workings of control but also that ‘it is *through* protocol that one must guide one’s efforts, not against it’ (Galloway 2004: 17). In the face of the power of the ‘superpanopticon’ to fix the self, Poster suggests, we ‘might search for new configurations of selfhood that keep open spaces of resistance’, spaces that we will find ‘especially in the human–machine mediascapes of networked computing’ (Poster 2006: 115). Bratton’s Stack model ‘is global but not immutable’. The intrinsic modularity that gives it its power is the same modularity that makes it ‘a platform, and an interface event, for the redesign and replacement of the Stack-we-have with a Stack-we-want (or perhaps with the Stack-we-want-the-least)’ (Bratton 2015: xviii). The potential for change via the multitude in Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* has been highlighted by them as well as other theorists of control such as Terranova, who underlines how her understanding of information comes with ‘a specific reorientation of forms of power *and* modes of resistance’ (Terranova 2004: 37). And the final task that Harcourt sets himself in his analysis of ‘expository society’, is ‘To explore how to resist and disobey’ (Harcourt 2015: 26).

So what about art and culture and their role in understanding or resisting control culture? As I underlined at the beginning of this Introduction, Deleuze identifies art as key to such projects. The present collection builds on the work that has already been done in the field of biopolitics while marking the grounds for a variable but sustained engagement with the relation between different art forms, modes of cultural expression and control. Beginning with an approach from a sceptical perspective, the first chapter, by Gregg Lambert, offers a report of an investigation into Deleuze’s conception of control and what Lambert argues to be its all too prevailing and mythic influence in discussions of biopolitics. In his ‘Notes from an Investigation of “Control Society”’, he argues that Deleuze’s observations – which he regards as a mutation of Foucault’s analysis of the *dispositif* of discipline – include an element of science fiction that spoils its capacity to function as the teleology of contemporary political and social transformations. Reading Deleuze’s piece alongside Ray Bradbury’s short story ‘The Pedestrian’, linking it to Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, as well as comparing the latter to Foucault’s notes in *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Lambert’s investigation not only questions philosophy as a tool of prognostication more generally but also points to an ‘inflationary and paranoid style’ shaping this part of Deleuze

and Guattari's work. Situating the control essays in the context of the historical as well as personal turbulence from which they were conceived, Lambert does suggest that some aspects of Deleuze's mutation can and should be pursued while ultimately putting Deleuze out of a job.

Lambert's chapter opens up a critical intuition that begins to define a perspective further illuminated in the following set of chapters, which is that Deleuze's elaboration on Foucault is useful in some ways but that it needs to be problematised or expanded to be of much help. Lambert stresses the importance of beginning the work of developing 'different conventions for establishing our contemporary relationship between power and knowledge', and in Chapter 2 Neel Ahuja pursues race accordingly as a severely underexplored potential of Deleuze's work on control. Such missing explorations are, perhaps, unsurprising considering the missing articulation of race in Deleuze's own work, but in 'Post-Mortem on Race and Control', Ahuja investigates the usefulness of Deleuzian control theory for critical race studies. Apart from the lack of an explicit relation to race in Deleuze's own work on control, the understanding of the development of control as a devaluation of the institutions of Foucauldian discipline and especially the prison marks another reason why the interest in Deleuze's conception of control has been limited within the field of critical race studies, which has strongly disputed claims that state violence, including incarceration and torture, has declined. However, Ahuja shows, there are ways in which Deleuzian theories of control can be used productively within this field, especially as a means of elucidating the relation between the long history of racial violence and the plasticity of contemporary biopolitics of race. Indeed, and as he notes, these theories have already been put to use by key scholars in the field, such as Jasbir Puar. Control theories, he concludes, do need to be rethought 'from the inside out', but if and when they are, they can be of importance to understanding race in a context of a contemporary, posthuman landscape.

In Chapter 3, 'Periodising (with) Control', Seb Franklin notes that while Deleuze's different writings on control are often seen to provide us with a relatively linear and historically determinable distinction between discipline and control, taking on longer-term formations such as race, class, gender, sex and disability quickly problematises any clear successive relation between the two. Addressing the role of cultural production, he insists that 'a cultural logic of control' must extend beyond its more obvious applications such as computer technology, post-industrial labour forms and science fictional projections of high-tech futures. To exemplify this, Franklin reads M. NourbeSe Philip's cycle of poems – *ZONG!* – from 2008, which is based on the massacre of enslaved Africans to collect insurance money in 1783. This poem, he argues, illuminates several mechanisms customarily associated with societies of control and it thereby reminds us not to be too near-sighted when it comes to periodis-

ing control. Such a wider focus as regards the periodising of control is pursued also by Carin Franzén in Chapter 4, 'Subjects of Sovereign Control and the Art of Critique in the Early Modern Period', where she suggests that contemporary societies of control share similarities with societies of sovereignty. Reminding us of Deleuze's suggestion that modes of control from sovereign societies may indeed reappear, Franzén identifies, explores and excavates such similarities in terms of the ambiguity of control as simultaneously enslaving and liberating. Following Foucault while conducting a careful reading of the form and function of genres developed in the wake of Montaigne, such as fables, letter writing and maxims, Franzén points to ways in which such discursive and aesthetic practices functioned as a subtle but integral mode of critique of contemporary sovereign modes of control. Style is crucial to such practices as they constitute the means of negotiating sovereign modes of power, including docility as well as human sovereignty. Adding to Foucault's thinking of stylisation and critique, Judith Butler's notion of 'virtue' and Catherine Malabou's conception of plasticity, she shows how libertine subjects made cultural practices into an 'art of critique'. Perhaps, she argues, we can learn something from them in encountering and negotiating control society; perhaps a contemporary critique of neoliberal rationality can find use of such 'potential of artistry'.

Another type of near-sightedness is identified and interrogated in Cary Wolfe's chapter, 'Posthumanism, Social Complexity, and the Political: A Genealogy for Foucault's *The Birth of Biopolitics*', in which he explores the possibilities for a posthumanist conception of control. Critically interrogating Wendy Brown's recent suggestion that Foucault's antagonism towards Marxist theories renders his work unable to take on board the mechanisms of a contemporary neoliberal society, Wolfe argues that Foucault does have a relation to Marxism – but one that is less humanist than that sought by Brown. Wolfe thereby sheds light on a conception of the political that he sees as better suited to the political mechanisms of the present. By bringing out theories of social complexity articulated by Foucault in his analyses of transitions between disciplinary societies and governmentality, by Deleuze in his essays on control society, and by Niklas Luhmann, Wolfe argues that the sphere of the political is not on the wane, as Brown insists, but, quite on the contrary, that we in a true Foucauldian fashion need to challenge our assumptions about 'what the political is and how it operates' and then to recognise that everything has become more political.

Where the first set of chapters thus interrogates conceptions of discipline and control from different perspectives, the second set of chapters puts these conceptions to work looking specifically at different modes of cultural expression – music, cinema, television, literature and philosophy – and also more directly at the intensification of control after the post-World War II

period that Deleuze describes. Thus, in Chapter 6, “‘That Path is for Your Steps Alone’: Popular Music, Neoliberalism and Biopolitics’, Jeffrey T. Nealon argues that popular music constitutes a prime ‘operating system’ of biopower in the present. Naturally, other art forms too are implicated in biopower, but unlike say poetry, novels, or art, the ever-presence of music in our contemporary everyday lives makes it a privileged example of what Guattari calls ‘machinic enslavement’. As such, Nealon underlines, it constitutes an ideal target for mapping the development of biopolitics and control as well as a supreme place to look for Deleuze’s ‘new weapons’. Tracing the function of popular music from the counterculture to the present, he shows how notions of the individual and authenticity as well as of freedom and resistance have to be rethought. A clear shift during these decades is that the ideas of self-realisation that were intended to position subjects outside societal institutions and norms in the 1960s have become an imperative in a present that thrives exactly on constant updates and modulations. As such, we can no longer neither rely on Adornian rejections of popular music as meaningless distraction from more authentic concerns nor on countercultural celebrations of music’s potential for transgressive authenticity, but we have to find alternative ways of understanding the role of music as well as its potential for resistance.

In Chapter 7, Gregory Flaxman explores control and cinema. Deleuze’s work on control emerges around the same time as his two cinema books and in the latter, Flaxman notes, we can find an investigation of control society *avant la lettre*. In ‘Cinema in the Age of Control’, Flaxman takes off from ways in which the critical and cartographic dimensions of cinema carry a correspondence to disciplinary society and compares this to what he observes as contemporary Hollywood cinema’s preoccupation with the notion of being ‘off the grid’. Exploring *The Bourne Identity* and its successors as paradigmatic of this preoccupation – which may be traced exactly to its current and seeming vanishing point – he notes that such films repeatedly return to the fantasy of escaping off the grid. Being both symptomatic as well as diagnostic, the film evinces a set of elaborations of the grid that also can be seen as aspects of control society and thus as useful to understandings of control. At the same time, and as the hero of these films repeatedly succeeds by tricking an increasingly digitalised and all-encompassing control system by means of old-school tactics, thus seemingly suggesting that the weapons are to be found in the lingering elements of disciplinary society, Bourne’s preternaturally gifted character also makes clear that only those who are more than human may succeed in such endeavours.

Control and contemporary television programming is investigated in Chapter 8, Colin Gardner’s ‘Towards a “Minor” Fascism: Panoptic Control and Resistant Multiplicity in TV’s *Spooks*’. Gardner takes a look at the television series *Spooks* and the way it both thematically and formally presents the

fluidity of a surveillance culture that includes MI5 and the CIA as well as their Russian counterparts and traditional enemies. Elucidating the fluid relationships between these supposedly very different agencies and showing how the series uses the television medium to parallel this fluidity and make the viewer complicit in this modulatory surveillance culture, Gardner maps the *dispositif* of what he calls a 'velvet fascism'. This concept he arrives at by adapting Deleuze and Guattari's concept of a minor literature to account for what, through the series, emerges as a 'minor fascism', which becomes a useful way for him to account for the connecting non-hierarchical and deterritorialising lines of the control culture portrayed in the series. Like Flaxman, Gardner draws up connections with Deleuze's *Cinema II: The Time-Image* and in particular with Deleuze's analysis of false movements. In *Spooks*, however, such movements do not open towards a 'people yet to come', but rather – and as the progressive or revolutionary is replaced by the multiplicity, and this multiplicity becomes the driving force of the *dispositif* of surveillance culture – *Spooks* makes us part of an abstract machine in which a minor fascism is the only mode of negotiation.

A short story is in focus in Chapter 9, 'Species States: Animal Control in Phil Klay's 'Redeployment'', where Colleen Glenney Boggs shows how Klay's eponymous story opens up for a way of theorising control as an object in and of itself. This key feature of the intensification of control, she notes, is difficult to theorise and Klay's story is therefore useful in that it provides concrete ways of reading this recession of a separation between control and the objects of control. Boggs' analysis, which positions Foucauldian theories of biopower in relation to contemporary cartoons as well as Locke's conception of education, shows how the redeployed soldier in Klay's story finds himself simultaneously unable to maintain or break species borders, and is also unable to distinguish himself from the control structures of which he is part. As control becomes its own object, conceptions of subjects and objects, humans and animals, home and war are put at stake.

Chapter 10, 'Control and a Minor Literature', explores potential implications of theories and mechanisms of control on our reading of the novel as a literary form. As I note in this chapter, the modern Western novel is shaped largely alongside the emergence of modern industrialisation and thus with the consolidation of disciplinary society in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The novel, as well as theories thereof, has been strongly influenced by the centrality of the individual subject to such power structures. If it is correct that the intensification of control comes with a shift from the individual to the *dividual*, I ponder, will this mean that the novel changes or that our readings of it will? Picking up on Deleuze's brief reference to Kafka in his 'Postscript', I take this back to Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of the particularities of the novel form in their study of Kafka and suggest that this can help us think about the relation between literature and control.


In the eleventh and final chapter, simply titled 'Philosophy and Control', we return to philosophy with Paul Patton who maps out how transitions between discipline and control are visible in the changing role of universities in general, and in the discipline of philosophy in particular. Patton traces the disciplinary moulds shaping an earlier history of philosophy both in terms of institutional mechanisms and in terms of what Deleuze calls the Image of Thought and sees how this assemblage, in Deleuzian terms, or apparatus in a Foucauldian sense, has shaped philosophical thinking. In societies of control, he notes, such assemblages are challenged by the neoliberal university's role as a service provider to extra-academic fields. This comes with increasing demands on philosophers to be of relevance to real-world policy and economic and political issues. The changing roles of institutions which Deleuze points towards is thus clearly visible, he notes, in a neoliberal present that puts pressure on philosophy to become a useful tool for achieving various entrepreneurial and practical ends. Patton picks up on the conceptualisation of 'field philosophy' as a means to respond to this situation. Noting the similarities between such post-disciplinary philosophy and Deleuze's conception of experimental philosophy, he notes that both can be seen as producing a 'rhizomatic Image of Thought', a concept which should be useful to us in further analysis of the relation between control culture and philosophy today.

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