

1

THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN 'NEW TURKEY'

Pierre Hecker, Ivo Furman and Kaya Akyıldız

Final Destination: 'New Turkey'

Here we go! Speeding away from 'Old Turkey'. It is time to do away with the rule of those rootless, upper class 'White Turks', disrespectful to our traditions and beliefs. Ignorant and repressive, those dandies sipping their whiskeys by the Bosphorus while we toil away. But in the glare of the headlights, we can see the promised land approaching. All of us, together, cruising down the highway towards 'New Turkey'. Towards a better land. A better future. A future of prosperity, pride, piety and freedom. This is where we are going . . . But are we really? Or did we already speed past our destination? Was there a terrible accident? Did we spin off the track? Are we still on the move? We're no longer so sure . . . But, yes, of course, of course we are. We still believe in the cause. In what we are being told. Constantly. In mass meetings, on TV, at school and on almost every social media channel. We are still on the move. Still on track. We did not miss the exit. We are close. Still cruising. Despite all the odds. Just a few yards left to the promised land, only a few more years left to 2023, and to bringing this blessed march, our heroic journey, to its final destination. After almost a thousand years. After Alp Arslan defeated the mighty Byzantine Empire and Sultan Mehmet, 'The Conqueror', scaled the walls of Istanbul. We resumed the struggle of the Ottoman sultans, and we will reclaim what is ours. Now is the moment to recover what was lost. To restore our dignity and pride. All under the command of one strong leader committed to realizing the will of the Turkish people.

Speaking in metaphors might not be the most conventional way of opening an academic discussion. Envisioning a road trip to ‘New Turkey’, however, does help to illustrate the mythical nature of authoritarian populism. Indeed, myth has become a key component of Turkish politics. This book is underpinned by the basic contention that, under the political dominance of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Turkey has been undergoing an ideological transition from one hegemonic project to another, from ‘Old’ to ‘New Turkey’.

The effects of this change and the question of what exactly is new about ‘New Turkey’ have been addressed and answered in various ways in a wide array of studies conducted by researchers from different academic disciplines. In contrast to other works, however, this book aims to explain how the transition from ‘Old’ to ‘New Turkey’ is negotiated on the field of culture. This transition, it will be argued here, is facilitated by modern-day myths that aim to persuade the public into consenting to the ruling elite’s claim to power.

This volume builds on the British tradition of Cultural Studies. It is profoundly influenced by classic works in this tradition, such as *Culture and Society* (Williams 1958), *Resistance Through Rituals* (Hall and Jefferson 2003 [1975]), *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (Hebdige 1979), *Policing the Crisis* (Hall et al. 1978) and *The Politics of Thatcherism* (Hall and Jacques 1983). Its theoretical foundations and terminology directly originate from these works and the debates they have given rise to. Such debates have ranged over moral panics and the breakdown of societal consensus, cultural practices and ideological commitment, incorporation and resistance, cultural representations and signifying practices and, last but not least, political power and authoritarian populism.

Against this backdrop, the present book seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the rise of authoritarian populism and the decline of democracy in Turkey.¹ In doing so, it also aims to link the Turkish case to a wider debate on the global ascent of contemporary authoritarianism. Turkey under Erdoğan shares certain commonalities with the ascendance of other right-wing populist politicians who came to power through democratic elections and proceeded to dismantle the democratic institutions of state and society. Arguably, similar processes have occurred in, for instance, Hungary under Orbán, the United States under Trump or Poland under Kaczynski and Duda.

Turkey's new ruling elite has moved to disintegrate the democratic framework of Turkish politics, shatter the idea of societal consensus as based on the principles of democratic pluralism and manipulate the public into a mood of bellicose, patriotic fervour. At the time of writing this introduction, this last factor had brought Turkey to the brink of war with neighbouring Greece and embroiled the country in unpredictable military adventurism in Syria, Iraq and Libya. Certainly, 'New Turkey' set out to reverse the achievements of 'Old Turkey's' secularist modernity and erase the cultural legacy of Kemalism. Moreover, inspired by a sense of imperialist nostalgia, Sunni supremacism and traditional patriarchalism, 'New Turkey' aims to restore the nation's imagined former greatness.

In August 2020, the Republic of Turkey's Directorate of Communications released a professionally produced agitprop video replete with references to the military victories of the past and the visual iconographies of Turkish nationalism and modern Islamism. This symbolism was complemented with a heroic background tune in fulsome praise of the 'Red Apple' (*kızıl elma*). The red apple holds a firm place in Turkic mythology and modern Turkish nationalism. It is a polysemic symbol used in literature and poetry, where it often functions as a metaphor for an imaginary place of longing. However, it also signifies the Ottoman Empire's urge to expansionism and its ultimate claim to world domination. According to this worldview, the Muslim Turk is destined to conquer and rule. In particular, for the Christian lands to the west of the Ottoman Empire, the idea of the red apple represented a constant threat to their very existence. During the Ottoman age of conquest, the red apple was inevitably equated with European cities such as Rome, Budapest or Vienna (Setton 1992, 29–46; Gökyay 2002, 559–61). For much of the twentieth century, however, Kemalist *realpolitik* rendered the myth of the red apple obsolete. Its re-emergence in a state-funded, high-profile agitprop video signals 'New Turkey's' departure from the 'peace at home, peace in the world' paradigm that guided Turkish foreign policy for decades. The message conveyed here indicates a more aggressive stance in world politics. Indeed, the Directorate of Communications itself describes the red apple anthem as 'the sacred march of our nation that made history from Manzikert to July 15'.² In an audacious act of self-aggrandisement, the propaganda video not only announces Turkey's re-emergence as a world power in the twenty-first

century; it also spurs fantasies of future expansionism. The four-minute visual narrative ends with an aerial view of the Temple Mount and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem – a feature that the State of Israel might certainly consider disturbing.

The production of the video incorporates elements of an old school leadership cult, nationalist folklore and the aesthetics of a popular TV series. The ruling elite's capacity to exploit the appeal of nationalism and Islam through popular culture and to mobilise the population across political camps should not be underestimated. Most opposition parties find it increasingly difficult to distance themselves from the use of such grotesque forms of patriotic mobilisation – unless, of course, they want to risk being denounced as traitors to the nation, flag and fatherland.

Turkey's democratic breakdown and the rise of pious conservatism under AKP rule did not come completely out of the blue, however. Some authors argue that present political developments are the outcome of a protracted process that has its roots in the history of modern Turkey. One might cite the bloody end of the Menderes era and the policies of the centre-right, conservative Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) as important milestones towards Erdoğan's authoritarian rule. Others might stress the state's ideological shift towards the political doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis at the height of the Cold War. These events and developments undoubtedly paved the way for the rise of political Islam and pious conservatism. Nonetheless, the present volume focuses exclusively on the era of authoritarian populism that has characterised what the present ruling elite calls 'New Turkey'.

Accepting culture as a site of political struggle, *The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Turkey* seeks to tie in with Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber's 2002 book *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*. The authors who contributed to *Fragments of Culture* provided a unique insight into the social and cultural transformation of daily life in Turkey around the turn of the new millennium, immediately before the AKP came to power. Their studies covered issues such as national culture, populist nostalgia, articulations of Islamic identity in popular culture and, last but not least, the politicisation of culture in everyday life.

The present volume aims to fill a gap that has emerged in the field of contemporary Turkish cultural studies since the publication of *Fragments of*

Culture. The chapters of this book function much like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle; once assembled, they form a single, comprehensive picture of the politics of culture in 'New Turkey'. Prior to writing their chapters, the authors agreed on a particular theoretical framework and a set of predetermined analytical concepts ('culture', 'hegemony', 'myth' and so on). These concepts will be outlined on the following pages of this introductory chapter. However, before entering into the discussion of the theoretical framework, it seems essential to share some thoughts on Turkey's 'authoritarian turn', and the (ideological) impact this has had on everyday life in Turkey.

Taking a Wrong Turn on Democracy Road

The AKP has held power uninterruptedly since November 2002; indeed, the party has set a record as the longest-serving government in modern Turkish history. During this period, Erdoğan's most loyal supporters have established themselves as Turkey's new ruling elite. The last remnants of Turkey's once secularist regime have been more or less erased. The AKP has successfully consolidated its power over the state, absorbed or paralysed broad sections of civil society and the media (Akser and Bayburt-Hawks 2012; Yesil 2016) and nurtured its contacts with conservative businessmen in order to gain a strong and profitable foothold in Turkey's thriving economy.

Moreover, the ruling elite's unbridled appetite for power has resulted in a change to Turkey's political system, from a parliamentary democracy to an authoritarian presidential system that no longer operates on the basis of the functional separation of powers (Öztürk and Gözaydın 2017; Yılmaz 2018). In a controversial referendum held on 16 April 2017, Turkey's pious conservative power bloc successfully convinced the Turkish electorate – or, at least, significant sections of it – to consent to the abolition of the democratic foundations of the Turkish constitution. This rather discomfiting success was preceded by the ruling elite's vehement attempt to generate societal consensus, and to naturalise its own political views as the commonly accepted norm.

A few years earlier, many observers were still praising the 'Turkish model'. They did so not only because of this model's apparent reconciling of political Islam with the principles of secularism, human rights and a free market economy (Özbudun 2006, 547–8; Tuğal 2016, 4), but also for its generation of a pro-European discourse of liberal democracy, human rights and

the rule of law (for example Yavuz 2006; Uzgel and Duru 2009). The ideological reorientation of Turkish political Islam as represented by the AKP has been described variously as Turkey's 'Islamist "New Thinking"' (Çavdar 2006), an 'Anatolian Revolution' (Şen 2010), 'post-Islamism á la Turca' (Dağı 2013), a 'passive revolution' (Kuru 2006) or the triumph of an 'Islam without extremes' over militant Islamism (Akyol 2011).

To be sure, the AKP's early years in power did yield a set of thorough – though temporary – reforms in the field of human rights and the rule of law. This essentially liberated Turkey's political system from military tutelage. Against this backdrop, it was even suggested that Turkey could serve as a genuine model for the rest of the Islamic world and become a cornerstone of political stability in the Middle East. The term 'New Turkey' was popularised in the light of this success story and initially used to describe the new political era that perceivably began with the AKP's accession to power in 2002.

A key aspect of the AKP's rise to power was an unprecedented economic boom during its first decade of government. Turkey's inflation rate dropped to single figures for the first time in decades, billions of dollars of foreign direct investment stimulated the national market, Turkish companies expanded trade with foreign markets around the world and ordinary citizens experienced a considerable rise in real incomes and spending power. The political scientist Soner Çağaptay had cause to assert that Turkey would 'become the twenty-first century's first Muslim global power' (2014, 11) and possibly catch up with Europe economically. This would ensue, he suggested, if Turkey continued to adhere to its recipe for success; a combination of liberal democracy, free market economics and reformist determination. Turkey's newfound economic power became an important source of national pride and confidence, one that could be instrumentalised by the government to legitimise its rule. The vision of 'New Turkey' glistened in the glare of prosperity and power.

This unambiguously positive image lost much of its appeal after the government, in an attempt to quell democratic protests against its rule, resorted to a wide array of repressive measures against its opponents. More recent publications commonly associate the term 'New Turkey' with the 'authoritarian turn' that became obvious during and after the protest-laden summer of 2013 (for example David and Toktamış 2015; Waldman and Çalışkan

2016; Cabas 2017; Yılmaz 2018). Furthermore, more recent publications claim the advent of a new 'Islamist turn' (Yılmaz 2019) and the dawn of a post-Kemalist (Aytürk et al. 2019), post-secularist (Öztürk 2019) era driven by the ruling elite's intention to Islamise Turkish society (Kaya 2015).

In the wake of the political crisis that followed the Gezi Park protests, the ruling party, in an apparent rallying cry to its supporters, began to conjure the image of 'New Turkey' as a populist political concept (Yesil 2016, 11). Slogans such as 'On the Way to New Turkey' ('*Yeni Türkiye Yolunda*'), 'New Turkey Will Be Strong' ('*Yeni Türkiye güçlü olacak*') or 'All Together For New Turkey' ('*Hep Birlikte Yeni Türkiye*') popularised the term among the ruling bloc's electorate. According to the policy think tank SETA, 'New Turkey' was the most frequently used catchphrase in the run-up to the 2015 national elections. It was also highly popular among those intellectuals who urged a yes vote for the adoption of an authoritarian presidential system in the constitutional referendum of 16 April 2017 (Bayram 2016, 47–8). 'New Turkey' came to represent not only the ruling elite's political agenda, but a rather mystical object of utopian longing, the realisation of which was being hindered by the perfidious kingpins of 'Old Turkey'.

Consequently, however, 'New Turkey' can only be invested with meaning in relation to what is imagined as 'Old Turkey'. 'New Turkey' is thus intended to signify the advent of a new hegemonic project that seeks to replace 'Old Turkey', its hegemonic adversary. Even so, despite the rather pretentious aspirations to a 'New Turkey', the concept remains somewhat vague. Its main function is obviously to obtain discursive supremacy over the ruling elite's political opponents. In the end, the mutually exclusive 'New Turkey' – 'Old Turkey' dichotomy stands for the political polarisation of Turkish society under AKP rule. However, it also points to a far-reaching shift in the balance of power.

In her ethnographic study *Nostalgia of the Modern* (2006), Esra Özyürek attested to a reversal in the balance of power between the centre and periphery in Turkish politics. The theoretical paradigm of the centre–periphery model was famously formulated by Şerif Mardin in an article for *Daedalus* in 1973. According to this paradigm, there exists a cultural divide between, on the one hand, the pious conservative sections of society and, on the other, the modernised bureaucratic state elite. While the numerically dominant

conservatives remain socially and politically marginalised, the secularist elite dominates the political and economic system. Both groups differ from each other in their lifestyles and political views, thereby generating constant conflict on a political level.

Mardin's binary framework has been strongly criticised as oversimplifying and failing to address a far more complex sociopolitical reality of fragmented, fluid power relations. As an organising framework for research on Turkey, it therefore appears somewhat outdated and, at least in terms of its strict binarism, perhaps even obsolete (see Bakiner 2018). However, this should not obscure the fact that the binarism portrayed by Mardin still holds populist appeal and significance in political discourse. In particular, the idea of a secularist top-down modernisation that never reached the peripheral religious masses is still highly influential. Indeed, such a narrative is deployed by the ruling elite in order to argue that *they* have been victimised and deprived of their right to rule. If we follow Mardin's argument that Islam is the culture of the periphery (Mardin 1973, 185), then the current ruling elite's attempt to re-legitimise Islam as the core of the Turkish nation marks a change in this power relationship.

Özyürek examined how ordinary citizens shifted the formerly dominant culture of Kemalism to the private sphere of the home. She further argued that the public visibility of secularist modernity has been replaced by 'the privatisation of state ideology', or simply the privatisation of politics (Özyürek 2006, 4, 7). This notion of a reversal of power relations elides with the findings of a survey conducted under the supervision of Binnaz Toprak (2009) at Boğazici University. This study aimed to analyse the relation between religiosity, conservatism and neighbourhood pressure (*mahalle baskısı*). It reached the conclusion that the otherisation and repression of individuals whose lifestyles differ from the pious conservative norm (for example non-Muslims, Alevis, homosexuals, secularists) can be directly associated with the AKP's rise to power. This also indicates that the former secularist pressure on Islamist lifestyle practices has been reversed.

A few years after Özyürek's and Toprak's studies, Jenny B. White published *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks* (2013). This contribution highlighted the AKP's aspiration to establish its own version of national identity and Turkishness as the commonly accepted norm. White argued that Turkey's new ruling class sought to discard the image of the Kemalism-inspired Muslim

Turk who favours a lifestyle based on secularist values. This image has been steadily replaced with the concept of the pious Muslim Turk whose identity is deeply rooted in a re-imagined Ottoman past. Designed as an anachronism to Kemalism, the ruling elite's favoured form of new Turkishness also came with a revised politics of memory that apparently aimed at a disremembering of Turkish secularist modernity and a reinvention of neo-Ottomanist nostalgia. White (2013, 9) exemplifies this by stressing the symbolic significance of paying public tribute to what the regime has identified as the key figures and events of Ottoman history; for example, the conquest of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmet Fatih in 1453 or, more recently, the First Battle of Kut in World War I (see Chapter 11 by Burak Onaran in this book).

The politics of (dis)remembering history and reinventing Turkish national identity revolves around the question of what is visible or invisible in public discourse. The new leadership quickly understood that the national education system provides an efficient tool for making 'things' (in)visible and adapting the younger generation to its version of Turkishness and national identity. The AKP is often said to be responsible for the privatisation and (neo)liberalisation of Turkey's educational institutions and services (İnal and Akkaymak 2012). To be sure, the government has, indeed, permitted private providers to capitalise on education. Moreover, however, the AKP has also successfully integrated its pious conservative ideology into the public education system.

Indeed, several studies, such as Iren Özgür's *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey* (2012), Ceren Lord's *Religious Politics in Turkey* (2018) or Elif Gençkal Eroler's *Raising a Religious Generation (Dindar Nesil Yetiştirmek, 2019)*, provide detailed insight into the ruling elite's comprehensive efforts to strengthen religious discourse in the field of education. In this context, the government has introduced new school textbooks and curricula focusing on religion. Furthermore, it has systematically strengthened public religious high schools at the expense of secular state schools, fully in keeping with President Erdoğan's call to educate a new pious generation.

From Fragments to Fault Lines of Culture

The key battleground wherein the contending hegemonic adversaries of Turkish society meet is, arguably, the realm of culture. It is here where they clash over norms, practices, representations and values. But the term 'culture'

is itself nebulous and slippery. Indeed, it has been described as ‘one of the most difficult concepts in the human and social sciences’ (Hall 1997, 3). Even though it is widely treated as a universal, commonly understood concept, it has been defined in a multitude of different ways. Within the scope of this book, culture is conceptualised in accordance with Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and relies in great part on the tradition of British Cultural Studies. The cultural is thus *always* linked to the political, and can only be fully understood if questions of power are taken into account.

It has been argued that political power works primarily on both a mental and a physical level, as a balance between consensus and coercion, ideology and force (Mitchell 1990, 545). For the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, ruling primarily through consensus rather than coercion provided the real key to political power in modern capitalist societies (Clarke et al. 2003 [1975], 38–41). What Gramsci referred to as cultural hegemony involves a constant process of negotiation. This process, even though it includes both dominant and subordinate groups (Storey 2016, 81), is less about negotiating consensus on the basis of societal compromise than about establishing the worldview of one particular group as the commonly accepted norm. It thus appears that consensus through dominance, rather than through compromise, determines Gramsci’s notion of hegemony.

Ultimately, then, hegemony depends on the ruling elite’s ability to establish and maintain control over public discourse. Discursive dominance is the power to control public narratives by popularising one narrative at the expense of others, or by preventing alternative, counter-hegemonic narratives from emerging. Such dominance enables the ruling elite to naturalise its interpretations of the world and to persuade the public into consenting to its rule. Hegemony thus works on a primarily ideological level, with coercive power required only temporarily in times of crisis.

At the time of writing, ‘New Turkey’s’ dominant power bloc holds control over (almost) the entire economic resources and institutions of the state. It successfully uses these resources and institutional tools of intervention to exert control over Turkey’s cultural industries (Kontny 2017, 55–7). In this way, Turkey’s key political powerbrokers directly influence public discourse and convince the populace of the ‘truthfulness’ of their own particular narratives. We might conceptualise these narratives as ‘modern-day myths’.

The term 'myth', as it is used here, draws on a series of essays published by the French cultural critic and literary theorist Roland Barthes in the French magazine *Les Lettres Nouvelles*. In these essays, Barthes coined the term 'modern-day myth' in order to unmask the ideological dimension of popular narratives in post-war French consumer culture (Barthes 2009 [1957]). Barthes was less interested in the supposedly fictional character of modern-day myths, and more in exposing their ideological foundations. According to Barthes, modern-day myths present themselves as universal, unquestionable narratives that *go-without-saying*. In fact, however, they are historically specific, artificial and ideologically coloured. Myths thus do not necessarily have to correspond with historical facts or hard evidence, because their main function is to preserve the status quo and facilitate the consolidation of dominant power structures.

The main purpose of myth is to circumvent possible conflicts over meaning, to overcome contradictions and to make the world explicable in a simplistic, 'mythical' way (Fiske 2001 [1987], 44; Storey 2016, 115). Barthes suggests that 'the oppressed' can resist the hegemony of the ruling class by forging alternative discourses against what is dominant. The ruling elite usually aims to restrict or deny access to the means of articulating alternative discourses 'with which to speak and think . . . opposition' (Fiske 2001 [1987], 44).

In the Turkish case, the ruling elite fully understands the significance of suppressing alternative narratives. It therefore uses its power to deny critics any recourse to the means of cultural production suitable for reaching a mass audience. On a related note, it imposes far-reaching restrictions to the right to freedom of expression and channels state resources only to those who support and promote dominant discourse. Though Barthes never directly referred to Gramsci, his notion of myth brings him close to Gramsci's idea of cultural hegemony. The purpose of this book is to expose the ideological abuse of modern-day myths by Turkey's ruling elite in its attempt to gain discursive supremacy over its political opponents and to expand its hegemonic powers over state and society.

One such popular myth is the reinvention of Sultan Abdülhamid II in Turkish public memory. In recent years, this myth has been engendered through TV series, schoolbooks, public commemoration ceremonies and other means of cultural production. Ousted from power in the Young Turk

Revolution of 1908, Abdülhamid II initially represented the ‘natural adversary’ of early Turkish republicanism (that is, today’s ‘Old Turkey’). The ‘Kemalist’ narrative depicted him as an illegitimate despot who tried to repress the fundamental principles of modern society, namely constitutionalism, nationalism and secularism. In order to maintain his absolute power and preserve imperial unity, Abdülhamid II was said to have awakened the spirits of an unruly Islamism.

In recent years, however, the sultan’s memory has been imbued with new meaning, especially in and through Turkish popular culture. In ‘New Turkey’, the Ottoman Empire’s last powerful sultan is depicted as a just, selfless, God-fearing leader who aimed to defend Muslim lands from ‘Western’ tyranny. The reinvention of Abdülhamid II as a modern-day myth can be pointedly observed in the recent popular drama series *Payitaht: Abdülhamid*. In his chapter for this volume, Caner Tekin carefully examines this series, which is striking in the extent to which it makes reference to contemporary politics. Indeed, the fictional character of Abdülhamid II appears to have been modelled on no less a figure than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Payitaht*, however, constitutes only one among many attempts to politically rehabilitate the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. In two separate chapters, Burak Onaran and Diliara Brileva also discuss the politics of memory as practised in other cinematic and televisual sources. Popular re-imaginings of Ottoman history in Turkish cinema and TV series blatantly insinuate the existence of meaningful connections between the political situation of the past (Sultan Abdülhamid’s late Ottoman Empire) and the present (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ‘New Turkey’). From this perspective, the reinvention of Abdülhamid II can be seen as an ideological manipulation of the Turkish public through the invention of a meaningful connection between the ruling elite’s present-day policies and a re-imagined Ottoman past. The popular movies and TV series discussed in this volume represent an attempt to prevent a struggle over meaning by naturalising a particular conception of history as ‘common sense’ for the Turkish nation. From the point of view of ‘New Turkey’, it now seems impossible to conceive a history of Turkey that is neither Islamic nor Ottoman.

‘New Turkey’ is thus committed to investing the Turkish nation’s Ottoman–Islamic heritage with new glory. But this attempt to reclaim the Ottoman past

(Ömür 2014, 125) has also found its way into the field of urban planning. In her contribution, Petek Onur scrutinises how 'New Turkey's' reinvention of the Ottoman past is manifest in the urban transformation of two historic neighbourhoods of Ankara, Turkey's capital city. Applying Svetlana Boym's concept of reflective and restorative nostalgia, Onur demonstrates how the politics of memory work through architectural structures. The spatial representations of neo-Ottomanism, however, appear to be directly influenced by Turkish popular culture or, more precisely, by popular TV series.

But aside from television, there are many forms of popular culture that are being effectively (ab)used in the struggle for 'New Turkey'. These include elaborately produced, and apparently generously financed, propaganda videos. The quality and visual aesthetics of these videos closely resemble internationally popular cinema and TV productions. In his chapter, Josh Carney analyses the 'zombie politics' of 'New Turkey' as represented in the visual rhetoric of the 2014 election ad 'The Nation Does Not Bow!'. This ad is commonly seen as a reaction to the Gülen movement's attempt to incriminate the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by releasing compromising audio recordings and raising corruption charges against several ministers and their relatives. Carney shows how this video overtly borrows imagery from the Hollywood zombie movie *World War Z*. The metaphoric implications of this, he argues, are the projection and prediction of Erdoğan's vision of a 'New Turkey' in which the ideal citizen is a zombie.

'Yes! We Shall Be Glorious!' is the title of yet another propaganda video released in the run-up to the constitutional referendum of April 2017. This video is analysed by Can Evren in order to demonstrate how, in Turkey, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's notion of competitive authoritarianism works through the cultural repertoire of football. Evren reads Turkish politics through the lens of football metaphors, which are used to make political claims and establish hegemony over the ruling elite's political opponents. In the football clip under scrutiny here, this effect is mainly achieved through a recital of popular myths, such as the victimisation of the Turkish nation at the hands of the treacherous 'West', or its resurrection in the face of despair. The patronising 'West' is represented here in the form of an antagonistic, predominantly white football team and a partisan referee. Both Carney's and Evren's case studies provide evidence for the significance of popular media

culture in emotionalising and mobilising the Turkish masses for the struggle to bring about ‘New Turkey’.

This struggle also comprises a systematic attempt to conceptualise the Turkish nation as a coherent cultural entity unified by its commonly shared language, religion and history. Insofar as it tends to conceal and deny the various cultural differences of Turkish society, ‘New Turkey’ is an intrinsically ideological project. In recent years, Turkey’s pious conservative power bloc has been consistently narrowing down the parameters for what it means to ‘be Turkish’. As early as 2009, a representative study by Binnaz Toprak et al. suggested that, under AKP rule, it has become increasingly difficult to be somehow ‘different’ in Turkey. The public visibility of ethnic, religious, sexual and lifestyle differences is accompanied by mounting social and institutional pressure. The ruling elite’s claim to be in sole possession of the right to define what Turkishness means has thus spawned resistance towards its new hegemonic project on various levels, especially among those sections of society that see their individual lifestyle choices under threat.

In particular, the dominant discourse of ‘New Turkey’ around national identity and the cultural parameters of Turkishness shows its immense complexity when faced with the question of how to deal with ethnic minorities. In this book, these issues of ethnicity are discussed in three consecutive chapters. While Kaya Akyıldız critically engages with the Turkish government’s Sunni supremacist policies towards the country’s Alevi community, Danielle V. Schoon and Erol Sağlam explore two different cases of supposedly successful ethnic incorporation.

Firstly, Schoon addresses the ambiguous relationship of incorporation and resistance with respect to Turkey’s Roma population. In ‘New Turkey’s’ discourse on national identity, the state’s policy towards the *Romanlar* has been set up as an example of ‘good practice’. These policies supposedly attest to the ruling elite’s tolerance towards cultural diversity and pluralism. Schoon analyses how Turkey’s *Romanlar* help to maintain the political status quo by publicly pledging their support for the government. On the other hand, however, they also successfully seek to establish their presence in Turkey’s national discourse through cultural performances that only draw considerable public attention due to the community’s proximity to the government. To be sure the *Romanlar*’s ‘art of presence’ does not pose a direct political challenge to ‘New

Turkey's' hegemonic project. Nonetheless, it can be regarded as ideologically contentious, insofar as the community's supposedly immoral, deviant cultural practices, such as drinking alcohol, lascivious dancing or musical entertainment, openly contradict the ruling elite's ideas of pious conservatism.

Erol Sağlam's contribution, meanwhile, focuses on the Romeyka-speaking communities of Trabzon. This chapter expounds on how the region's originally non-Turkish population, through discretion of certain sociocultural differences, developed a staunch sense of Turkishness – but without renouncing these distinctions altogether. Based on extensive ethnographic field research, the author carves out in detail how particular non-conforming or supposedly 'non-Turkish' sociocultural aspects are accommodated. He further shows how this process of accommodation contributes to the long-term preservation of Romeyka.

The concept of culture used in this volume is by no means supportive of the idea of culture as a 'container' – that is, of the existence of a coherent and cohesive national culture. Nor does this book conceive culture as something restricted to the realms of the arts, or as something that can be easily divided into 'high' or 'low' cultural forms. On the contrary, this book explicitly includes the realm of the ordinary and everyday life within the concept of 'culture' that it adopts.

Accordingly, the authors featured in this volume do not confine their study of culture to artistic production.³ In fact, they seek to analyse performative acts of cultural production in everyday life. This might include wearing a particular form of dress or style, consuming alcoholic beverages, kissing in public, performing or non-performing religious rituals or using a specific rhetoric in terms of favouring particular words and phrases while deliberately avoiding others. The choices a person makes in everyday life, to use a particular gesture, dress, word or haircut – all of these choices constitute the way that a person lives.

However, these choices can also be seen as expressive of particular ideological commitments, and thus of maintaining or contesting the dominant hegemonic order. It is the choice to conform or not to conform that makes an individual's personal life convey ideological meaning. For instance, in the Turkish context, whether or not a person fasts during Ramadan tells us little more than that he or she is conforming to a societal norm. However, should

this individual one day completely stop fasting or engaging in any religious practices, then this can be interpreted as a contestation of this norm.

Against this backdrop, this volume aims to critically engage with questions of everyday cultural politics and institutionalised cultural policies alike. Engaging with the politics of culture in ‘New Turkey’ means developing an understanding of culture as a medium of both maintaining and contesting political power. Culture must thus be seen as a site of ideological struggle. On this terrain, a constant process of negotiation between dominant and subordinate groups in society plays out. This process is marked by acts of resistance and containment (see Storey 2016, 76). Culture thus works as a medium of maintaining and contesting political power.

When Barthes wrote his ‘Mythologies of the Month’, he discussed topics that had been rather arbitrarily selected. These ranged from ‘The World of Wrestling’ and ‘Soap-powders and Detergents’ to ‘Toys’, ‘Striptease’ or ‘The New Citroen’. In ‘Wine and Milk’ (Barthes 1991 [1957], 58–61), he analysed the signifying function of wine in French society. The meaning of wine, as Barthes stressed, is full of contradictions: it can be sustenance for the worker, a sign of virility for the intellectual; in winter it keeps you warm, in summer it refreshes. In France, Barthes argued, wine is never associated with the desire to get drunk or with crime – as it is, for instance, in Turkey. For Barthes, the contradictory meanings attached to wine can only be sustained because, ultimately, wine signifies French identity. To drink wine is to be part of France – it is to be French. This is the manner in which myths function in modern society. Myth takes a purely cultural and historical object such as wine and transforms it into the sign of a universal value: in this case, collective French identity (see also Allen 2003).

More than sixty years after Barthes wrote his famous essay, the politics of wine – or, more precisely, the politics of *rakı* and *ayran* – can be observed today in ‘New Turkey’. In spring 2013, a well-known photo of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sparked public controversy over the ‘true’ nature of the Turkish nation. From a Barthean perspective, the photographic image under scrutiny here consists of multiple layers of meaning that need to be uncovered one by one in order to elicit the modern-day myth lying hidden beneath. Barthes differentiates between first-order, denotative (or ‘literal’) meanings and second-order, connotative meanings. The latter evoke more abstract

concepts in the observer's mind. With respect to first-order meanings; the image at stake here depicts a middle-aged man dressed in an old-fashioned suit that is half-hidden under a black coat. In his right hand, he holds a transparent glass filled with a white coloured liquid. His head slightly bowed, the man's gaze is directed to a point hidden from the camera.

If we bring a little bit of historical knowledge to bear, we can quickly identify the image as a photograph of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father and first president of the Turkish Republic, who lived from 1881 to 1938. It is, however, the realm of second-order meanings where ideology and politics enter the equation. Shifting perspective to second-order meanings, the observer encounters a cultural representation of Mustafa Kemal. Even today, Kemal is treated as an almost sacred figure in Turkey's official state discourse, even though he signifies very different 'ideas' to the various political groups in today's society. To be sure, Turkish Islamists still widely despise him for bringing down the righteous religious order of the Ottoman Empire. And yet Turkey's founding father remains an untouchable icon, even for his most powerful political opponents. He signifies modern Turkey more than anything (or anyone) else. He thus represents a myth. Within the discourse on 'New Turkey', Mustafa Kemal clearly holds signifying power. This needs to be understood when discussing the meaning of the present photographic image.

However, it was not the cultural representation of Mustafa Kemal which sparked public controversy over the true nature of Turkishness. Rather, it was the milky white liquid in his right hand. Is it *rakı*? Is it *ayran*? From the visual depiction, both options seem possible. But how would it change dominant notions of Turkishness if the founding father of modern Turkey was seen to be holding a glass of *ayran* and not *rakı* in his hand? What if an anise-flavoured alcoholic beverage signifies Turkish identity more than a similarly refreshing yogurt drink?

This question poses an ideological and political challenge to the representatives of 'New Turkey' and to its opponents. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his supporters were quick to declare that Turkey's national drink is *ayran*, and thus that Mustafa Kemal was undoubtedly holding a glass containing this beverage. But Turkey's secularist opposition insisted that the image depicted Atatürk having a fine glass of *rakı* – which, needless to say, represents Turkey's true national drink.

For Turkey's pious conservatives, *ayran* stands for religiously induced abstinence from alcohol. In their mindset, Turkishness apparently means being a Muslim. Thus, Turks do not drink alcohol. This notion of national identity, which is closely connected to particular daily practices, does not correspond to social reality, but to 'New Turkey's' ideological project. Consequently, the issue of *rakı* or *ayran* becomes a matter of consensus and conflict, incorporation and resistance.

Even for Turkey's ruling power bloc, the idea of openly denouncing Mustafa Kemal over his lifestyle habits appears to have been a bridge too far. Consequently, the *rakı-or-ayran* controversy can also be seen as an attempt to incorporate Mustafa Kemal into the ruling elite's new hegemonic project of pious conservatism. If it is not possible to directly criticise the symbolic father of Turks, who evidently died from a cirrhosis of the liver caused by his drinking habits (Mango 1999, 513–25), then he must be reinvented and incorporated into the new hegemonic project. The message to be taken from the photographic image thus reads: 'Look! Mustafa Kemal was a good Muslim. He preferred to drink *ayran* over *rakı*. He is one of us. He wouldn't have opposed the present government over its lifestyle policies'.

Consequently, the consumption of alcohol becomes an act of deviance from the hegemonic project and an open contestation of power. Anyone drinking alcohol suddenly comes to represent the ideological other. In the same way, hanging a copy of the aforementioned photograph on the wall of a bar or restaurant must be seen as an expression of ideological commitment to the values of secularism, and an act of cultural resistance to the ideological implications of 'New Turkey'. The signifying function of *rakı* and *ayran* thus lies in its potential for cultural incorporation and resistance, and the attempt to establish a particular worldview as the commonly accepted norm.

In his contribution to this volume, Ivo Furman expands upon the cultural symbolic significance of alcohol in 'New Turkey'. His observation illustrates how the ruling elite has used alcohol to draw a symbolic line between the ideological grounds of 'Old Turkey' and 'New Turkey', thereby claiming political hegemony over the future of the Turkish nation. The attempted elimination of alcohol related practices from the public sphere can thus be seen as part of a drive towards discursive supremacy over the political (secularist) other. The ultimate aim is to entrench the ideological

views of pious conservatism as the commonly accepted norm. Alcohol has become such a deeply divisive, contentious issue that even a mundane practice like drinking a glass of beer or *rakı* in public has turned into an act of defiance and political activism, especially when done collectively. The ruling elite's obsession with alcohol is, furthermore, symptomatic of how Turkey's new power bloc seeks to intervene in people's individual lifestyle choices by imposing a regulatory regime on whatever behaviour is considered deviant from the new hegemonic norm.

The question of how a person lives – or, more precisely, how a person publicly displays his or her way of life – is a matter of ideological commitment, and an essential aspect of the hegemonic power struggle in present-day Turkey. Particular lifestyles and the everyday practices associated with them have the potential to challenge the legitimacy of the ideological 'other', thus laying claim to or contesting political power (Hecker 2018, 14). A given lifestyle practice can either signify resistance to the ruling class's dominant ideology and a breakdown of consensus within society, or it can contribute to stabilising or endorsing the dominant order.

In the early Republican era, women's bodies were ascribed a central function in the struggle for a modern nation. The image of the enlightened, Western-looking woman who had consciously removed her veil was meant to represent modern Turkish society. From now on, this society would be defined by secularism, constitutionalism and nationalism (for example Yılmaz 2013, 78ff.). During the heyday of Islamic revivalism in the mid-1990s, Turkish political Islam also made use of the female body – only this time, as part of an attempt to challenge the Kemalist state. Piously veiled women took to the streets and demanded their right to wear the Islamic veil in public offices and at university, thereby contesting the legitimacy of Turkey's secularist hegemony. The struggle for 'New Turkey' was fought, to a very considerable degree, at the behest of women. Women not only resisted the Kemalist state in the public sphere – they also organised highly effective networks for neighbourhood mobilisation in support of political Islam and today's ruling elite (White 2002, Doğan 2016). Veiling, however, not only functioned as an expression of ideological commitment, but also as a means of women's self-empowerment. It constituted a claim to the right to participate in those public spaces formerly controlled by men.

The prominent position of female activism and women's associations in the struggle for 'New Turkey' is analysed in two consecutive chapters of this book. Gülşen Çakıl-Dinçer draws on her extensive fieldwork with KADEM, a high-profile pro-government women's rights association. She explores 'New Turkey's' notion of a new womanhood. To put this differently, she analyses 'New Turkey's' ideal of a new female self-conception that is positioned in opposition to egalitarian feminism and defined by a pious conservative way of life. In doing so, she not only addresses KADEM's religiously inspired 'justice over equality' agenda in relation to feminism; she also draws attention to cracks within the hegemonic project, thereby problematising the inherently complicated relationship between KADEM and the AK Party's Women's Section.

Ayşe Çavdar revisits Turkey's women's rights debate from a different angle. She touches upon an even more recent, and all the more contentious, issue: the politics of unveiling. At the height of the #10yearschallenge, young women from conservative families posted photos of themselves before and after abandoning the Islamic headscarf. Women have functioned as the agents of a new era of pious conservatism ever since Turkish political Islam pitted itself against the Kemalist project. The Muslim woman wearing her headscarf in defiance of the secularist state represented, perhaps more than any other symbol, the myth of Islam's supremacy over secularism. Seeing the very same women publicly remove their headscarves represents a clear challenge to the cultural hegemony of pious conservatism itself. Moreover, however, Çavdar shows that the reactions of men towards women's unveiling also constitutes a rupture in the masculine hegemonic project of Islamism. The act of unveiling also poses a direct challenge to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's self-declared aim of raising a new, pious generation. Unveiling thus represents a counter-hegemonic move and a prelude towards leaving Islam and committing apostasy.

Pierre Hecker's contribution on atheism and non-belief in 'New Turkey' directly ties in with Çavdar's observations. The rise of pious conservatism has forced many non-believers into hiding. However, it has also triggered an awakening of atheist activism, which has resulted in the formation of Turkey's first ever Atheism Association (Ateizm Derneği). Hecker chooses organised atheism and the more recent debate on 'religious fatigue' as a starting point for his broader argument: that the ruling elite's striving for cultural hegemony has triggered a new secularist movement from below. Significantly, the intellectual

roots of this movement no longer lie solely in the Kemalist past. Based on a set of biographical interviews, Hecker's study also engages with the individual consequences of leaving Islam and being atheist in 'New Turkey'.

The Atheism Association formed as a direct result of Turkey's pro-democracy movement of 2013. In fact, the so-called Gezi Park protests provided the initial spark for the emergence of a number of non-governmental organisations which aimed to mount a defence of individual human rights, political pluralism and personal lifestyle choices. Berlin film-maker and artist Julia Lazarus widens the perspective of the present volume by providing an intimate insight into the counter-hegemonic discourse of ecological activism in Istanbul. She bases her chapter on the research conducted for her latest documentary film on the Northern Forests Defense activist group. Lazarus confronts the reader over both the practical and theoretical means, and the possibilities, of environmental resistance under the conditions of an authoritarian regime.

Gezi, which began with the protest of a few environmentalists against the demolition of a park of the same name in central Istanbul, gave birth to a dynamic creative impulse. This impulse has manifested itself in an unprecedented wave of artistic expression. The struggle between consensus and conflict, incorporation and resistance has also surfaced in the form of rock songs (such as Duman's *Eyvallah*, Murder King's *Demokrasi* and *Susma* or Serhad Raş'a's *Çapulcu'nun Şarkısı*), rap (for instance Şanışer's *#Susamam* or Ezhel's *Olay*), dance performances (famously remembered is the dance of the 'tear-gassed dervish', *gazlı derviş*), pop art illustrations (by Berkay Dağlar, Okan Bülbül and countless others), comic strips (such as, for instance, those by Sümeyye Keşgin), graffiti, satirical cartoons and various other forms of art expressed through a variety of mediums.

What most of these forms of artistic expression have in common is the attempt to convey an alternative narrative of events. The official narrative propagated by Turkey's ruling elite through the state media and the educational system contradicts this reading and interprets Gezi as an attempted coup d'état instigated by 'Western' foreign powers against Turkey's democratically elected government. But these new artistic impulses aim to narrate the Gezi Park protests as a pro-democracy movement that was meant to resist authoritarian rule.

In this book, Valentina Marcella investigates the counter-hegemonic discourse in the Turkish satirical magazines *Gırgır*, *Penguen*, *LeMan* and *Uykusuz* during the summer of Gezi. Her research gives a stunning account of how these magazines, over a long period of time, successfully challenged the dominant narrative through the power of wit and humour. Another form of (sub)cultural resistance is analysed by Douglas Mattsson. In his chapter on Islamic semiotics in Turkish black metal, he explores the counter-hegemonic potential of blasphemy in the struggle against the cultural dominance of pious conservatism.

To conclude this long argument about hegemony and resistance, let us now re-emphasise the overall purpose of this book. This volume brings together sixteen empirical case studies that, together, aim to make a broader argument: that the struggle between the forces of incorporation and resistance primarily takes place on the field of culture (Fiske 2001 [1987]; Storey 2016). Subordinate groups attempt to counter the ruling elite's striving for hegemony by challenging the dominant discourse with the help of cultural representations and signifying practices that deviate from the norm. By studying the politics of culture in 'New Turkey', this book contributes to a better understanding of the success of authoritarian populism and the decline of democracy in Turkey.

The interdisciplinary team of authors that contributed to this book came together and exchanged ideas long before this publication could be realised. A set of predefined concepts (myth, culture, hegemony, resistance, authoritarianism, popular culture and so on) were key to creating coherence between the various strands of research discussed in this book. The present volume is organised in five clusters, namely 'Subcultures and the Politics of Lifestyles', 'Satire and Agitprop in "New Turkey"', 'Civil Society and the Politics of Gender', 'Mediating Neo-Ottomanism in Popular Culture' and "'New Turkey's" Ethno-Religious Others'. The individual contributions in these clusters touch upon a wide range of subjects, including lifestyle practices, artistic expression, civil activism, media entertainment, minority politics and the politics of memory as represented in dominant and counter-narratives alike. As such, this volume does not exclusively address an academic audience, but also those more broadly interested in cultural studies and contemporary Turkish culture and society.

Notes

1. In the mid- to late 2000s, the government's reform efforts appeared to have initiated an inexorable transition from deficient to liberal democracy in Turkey. The authors do by no means intend to imply that a well-established liberal democracy had been in place prior to the AKP. It is the reversal of this process of democratic transition that we are referring to here.
2. Quoted from the Directorate of Communication's official website, <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/directorate-of-communications-releases-red-apple-anthem-to-mark-the-949th-anniversary-of-malazgirt-victory> (last accessed 20 November 2020).
3. It is no rare phenomenon that the terms 'culture' and 'art' are used indiscriminately. An author may speak of 'culture' while actually meaning 'art', or even restrict his or her study of culture to artistic production only. This may include *performing arts*, such as music, dance or theatre; visual arts, such as film, painting or calligraphy; applied arts, with a special focus on architecture; and, perhaps most importantly, literature. What these various forms of cultural production have in common is a creative impetus that intends to express particular ideas, emotions or experiences. Artistic production is, furthermore, widely assumed to require particular sets of advanced skills that need to be learned and trained beforehand (Hecker and Johannsen 2017, 6).

Bibliography

- Akser, Murat and Banu Baybars-Hawks. 'Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Model of Neoliberal Media Autocracy'. In *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, vol. 5 (2012): 302–21.
- Akyol, Mustafa. *Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011.
- Allen, Graham. *Roland Barthes*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Aytürk, İlker, Yüksel Taşkın, Yalın Aplay, Korkmaz Alemda and Selçuk Orhan, eds. 'Post-Kemalizm'. In *Varlık. Aylık Edebiyat ve Kültür Dergisi*, 86. Yıl, Sayı 1337 (2019). İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları.
- Bakiner, Onur. 'A Key to Turkish Politics? The Center-Periphery Framework Revisited'. In *Turkish Studies*, vol. 19, no. 4 (2018): 503–22.
- Barthes, Roland. *Mythologies*. London: Vintage Books, 2009 [1957].
- Bayram, Salih. *Türkiye'de Başkanlık Sistemi Tartışmaları. Algılar, Argümanlar ve Tezler*. İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2016.
- Cabas, Mirgün. *Eski Türkiye'nin Son Yılı*. İstanbul: Can Sanat Yayınları, 2017.

- Çağaptay, Soner. *The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century's First Muslim Power*. Washington: Potomac Books, 2014.
- Çavdar, Gamze. 'Islamist *New Thinking* in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?' In *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 121, no. 3 (2006): 477–97.
- Clarke, John, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts. 'Subculture, Cultures and Class'. In *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain*, edited by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, 9–74. London and New York: Routledge, 2003 [1975].
- Coşkun, Mustafa Kemal and Burcu Şentürk. 'The Growth of Islamic Education in Turkey: The AKP's Policies Toward Imam-Hatip Schools'. In *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey. Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of the AKP*, edited by Kemal İnal and Güliz Akkaymak, 165–77. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Dağı, İhsan. 'Post-Islamism á la Turca'. In *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, edited by Asef Bayat, 71–108. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- David, Isabel and Kumru F. Toktamış, eds. '*Everywhere Taksim*': *Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015.
- Doğan, Sevinç. *Mahalledeki AKP. Parti İşleyişi, Taban Mobilizasyonu ve Siyasal Yabancılaşma*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2016.
- Fiske, John. *Television Culture: Popular Pleasures and Politics*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001 [1987].
- Gençkal Eroler, Elif. '*Dindar Nesil Yetiştirmek*'. *Türkiye'nin Eğitim Politikalarında Ulus ve Vatandaş İnşası*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2019.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Hall, Stuart. 'Introduction'. In *Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, edited by Stuart Hall, 1–11. London: Sage, 1997.
- Hall, Stuart and Martin Jacques, eds. *The Politics of Thatcherism*. London: Lawrence and Wishart in association with *Marxism Today*, 1983.
- Hall, Stuart and Tony Jefferson, eds. *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003 [1975].
- Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts. *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1978.
- Hebdige, Dick. *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*. London and New York: Routledge, 1979.

- Hecker, Pierre. 'Islam. The Meaning of Style'. In *Sociology of Islam*, vol. 6 (2018): 7–28.
- Hecker, Pierre and Igor Johannsen. 'Concepts of Culture in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies'. In *Middle East – Topics & Arguments*, vol. 7 (2017): 5–13.
- İnal, Kemal and Gülüz Akkaymak, eds. *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey. Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of the AKP*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz and Ayşe Saktanber, eds. *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002.
- Kaya, Ayhan. 'Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity'. In *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 20, no. 1 (2015): 47–69.
- Kontny, Oliver. 'From Dissensus to Conviviality: Cultural Politics of Difference in Turkey'. In *Middle East – Topics & Arguments*, special issue on 'Culture', vol. 7 (2017): 51–63.
- Kuru, Ahmet. 'Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey. The Case of the Justice and Development Party'. In *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, edited by Hakan M. Yavuz, 136–59. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006.
- Lord, Ceren. *Religious Politics in Turkey. From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Mango, Andrew. *Atatürk*. London: John Murray, 1999.
- Mardin, Şerif. 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?' In *Daedalus*, vol. 102, no. 1, 'Post-Traditionalist Societies' (1973): 169–90.
- Mitchell, Timothy. 'Everyday Metaphors of Power'. In *Theory and Society*, vol. 19, no. 5 (Oct. 1990): 545–77.
- Okyay, Şaik Orhan. 'Kızılalma'. In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 25. Cilt (2002): 559–61. Ankara: TDV İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi.
- Ömür, Harmanşah. 'Urban Utopias and How They Fell Apart: The Political Ecology of Gezi Parkı'. In *The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey*, edited by Umut Özkırımlı, 121–33. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Özbudun, Ergun. 'From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey'. In *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 11, no. 3–4 (2006): 545–57.
- Özgür, İren. *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey: Faith, Politics, and Education*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi and İştâr Gözaydın. 'Turkey's Constitutional Amendments: A Critical Perspective'. In *Research and Policy on Turkey*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2017): 201–24.

- Öztürk, Şeyda, ed. 'Laiklikten Sonra'. *Cogito*, Sayı: 94, Yaz 2019. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
- Özyürek, Esra. *Nostalgia for the Modern. State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2006.
- Şen, Mustafa. 'Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party'. In *Turkish Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2010): 59–84.
- Setton, Kenneth M. *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992.
- Storey, John. *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture. An Introduction*. 5th edn. London: Pearson Longman, 2016.
- Toprak, Binnaz, İrfan Bozan, Tan Morgül and Nedim Şener. *Being Different in Turkey: Religion, Conservatism and Otherization. Research Report on Neighborhood Pressure*. İstanbul: Boğazici University, 2009.
- Tuğal, Cihan. *The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism*. London and New York: Verso, 2016.
- Uzgel, İlhan and Bülent Duru, eds. *AKP Kitabı. Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*. Ankara: Phoenix, 2009.
- White, Jenny B. *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*. Washington: University of Washington Press, 2002.
- White, Jenny B. *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Williams, Raymond. *Culture and Society: 1780-1950*. New York: Anchor Books, 1958.
- Yavuz, Hakan M., ed. *The Emergence of a New Turkey. Democracy and the AK Parti*. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006.
- Yesil, Bilge. *Media in New Turkey. The Origins of an Authoritarian Neoliberal State*. Urbana, Chicago and Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2016.
- Yılmaz, Battal. *The Presidential System in Turkey. Opportunities and Obstacles*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Yılmaz, Hale. *Becoming Turkish*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2013.
- Yılmaz, İhsan. 'Islamist Turn in Turkey, State Transnationalism and Transnational Islamist Unofficial Law'. Working Paper, 12 October 2019, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3485403> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485403> (last accessed 13 August 2020).
- Yılmaz, Zafer. *Yeni Türkiye'nin Ruhu*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2018.