DELEUZE, A STOIC

Ryan J. Johnson
Plateaus – New Directions in Deleuze Studies

‘It’s not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under a single concept but rather of relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations.’

Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations

Series Editors
Ian Buchanan, University of Wollongong
Claire Colebrook, Penn State University

Editorial Advisory Board
Keith Ansell Pearson, Ronald Bogue, Constantin V. Boundas, Rosi Braidotti, Eugene Holland, Gregg Lambert, Dorothea Olkowski, Paul Patton, Daniel Smith, James Williams

Titles available in the series
Christian Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze
Jean-Clet Martin, Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, translated by Constantin V. Boundas and Susan Dyrkton
Simone Bignall, Postcolonial Agency: Critique and Constructivism
Miguel de Beistegui, Immanence – Deleuze and Philosophy
Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Badiou and Deleuze Read Literature
Ronald Bogue, Deleuzian Fabulation and the Scars of History
Sean Bowden, The Priority of Events: Deleuze’s Logic of Sense
Craig Lundy, History and Becoming: Deleuze’s Philosophy of Creativity
Aidan Tynan, Deleuze’s Literary Clinic: Criticism and the Politics of Symptoms

François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event with The Vocabulary of Deleuze edited by Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, translated by Kieran Aarons
Frida Beckman, Between Desire and Pleasure: A Deleuzian Theory of Sexuality
Nadine Boljkovac, Untimely Affects: Gilles Deleuze and an Ethics of Cinema
Daniela Voss, Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas

Daniel Barber, Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-Secularism and the Future of Immanence
F. LeRon Shults, Iconoclastic Theology: Gilles Deleuze and the Secretion of Atheism
Janae Sholtz, The Invention of a People: Heidegger and Deleuze on Art and the Political
Marco Altamirano, Time, Technology and Environment: An Essay on the Philosophy of Nature
Sean McQueen, Deleuze and Baudrillard: From Cyberpunk to Biopunk
Ridvan Askin, Narrative and Becoming

Marc Rölli, Gilles Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism: From Tradition to Difference, translated by Peter Hertz-Ohmes
Guillaume Collett, The Psychoanalysis of Sense: Deleuze and the Lacanian School
Ryan J. Johnson, The Deleuze-Lucretius Encounter
Allan James Thomas, Deleuze, Cinema and the Thought of the World
Cheri Lynne Carr, Deleuze’s Kantian Ethos: Critique as a Way of Life
Alex Tissandier, Affirming Divergence: Deleuze’s Reading of Leibniz
Barbara Glowczewski, Indigenising Anthropology with Guattari and Deleuze

Koichiro Kokubun, The Principles of Deleuzian Philosophy, translated by Wren Nishina
Felice Cimatti, Unbecoming Human: Philosophy of Animality After Deleuze, translated by Fabio Gironi

Ryan J. Johnson, Deleuze, A Stoic

Forthcoming volumes
Justin Litaker, Deleuze and Guattari’s Political Economy
Nir Kedem, A Deleuzian Critique of Queer Thought: Overcoming Sexuality
Jane Newland, Deleuze in Children’s Literature
Sean Bowden, Expression, Action and Agency in Deleuze: Willing Events
Andrew Jampol-Petzinger, Deleuze, Kierkegaard and the Ethics of Selfhood

Visit the Plateaus website at edinburghuniversitypress.com/series/plat
DELEUZE, A STOIC

Ryan J. Johnson

EDINBURGH University Press
Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburhuniversitypress.com

© Ryan J. Johnson, 2020

Edinburgh University Press Ltd
The Tun – Holyrood Road,
12(2f) Jackson’s Entry,
Edinburgh EH8 8PJ

Typeset in 11/13 Sabon LT Std by
Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire
and printed and bound in Great Britain.

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 1 4744 6215 0 (hardback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 6218 1 (webready PDF)
ISBN 978 1 4744 6217 4 (epub)

The right of Ryan J. Johnson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
List of Abbreviations


This book is dedicated to the man who taught me the meaning of poetry: Maj Raigan, my poetry teacher at Kent State University. Maj died while I was writing the last lines of this book. I will never forget his Nietzschean lesson: ‘catching in the act the beauty proper to everything’. He is my model of what a person should be.
Introduction: The Egg

What Comes before the Study of Deleuze

Imagine we are students in a school of philosophy in late antiquity. We are learning about ancient Stoic philosophy and it is the beginning of the course. The first thing that the master would teach us is a now-forgotten genre of philosophical writing called ‘What Comes before the Study of . . .’ (Πρὸ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως . . .). Before studying their materialist metaphysics, before analysing their propositional logic, before dissecting their ethical doctrines, students first learned about the way of life of a classic Stoic philosopher – her βίος – which detailed when and where she lived, with whom she studied, tales of important travels, with whom she spent time, the historical context in which she worked, her catalogue raisonné, among other biographical details. While most examples of this ancient genre are lost, Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers collected anecdotes from them. Details of the philosophers’ in Diogenes’ Lives are amusing, contradictory, sometimes preposterous, although they still convey something essential about philosophers that cannot be found in their theoretical treatises and manuscripts. Nietzsche too appreciates this: ‘I for one prefer reading Diogenes Laërtius to Zeller, because the former at least breathes the spirit of the philosophers of antiquity.’ Before all else, students learned the kind of life a philosopher lived, and only afterwards, if this way of life was still desired, did students learn about their corresponding logical system or criterion of truth. Since scholars in the ancient schools organised courses according to a fixed sequence, this bio-philosophical genre acted as the first part of a schema isagogicum, or introductory scheme.

In our book, we develop a systematic account of ancient Greek and Roman Stoicism through its encounter with Gilles Deleuze and related twentieth-century French philosophers, beginning with a schema isagogicum of Deleuze himself.

A few months after he died, one of Deleuze’s students – André Bernold – published a biography of his old teacher, which we might
DELEUZE, A STOIC

consider a new contribution to that forgotten genre of writing: ‘What Comes before the Study of Deleuze’. Bernold wrote:

Deleuze, philosopher, son of Diogenes and Hypatia, sojourned at Lyon. Nothing is known of his life. He lived to be very old, even though he was often very ill. This illustrated what he himself had said: there are lives in which the difficulties verge on the prodigious. He defined as active any force that goes to the end of its power. This, he said, is the opposite of a law. Thus he lived, always going further than he had believed he could. Even though he had explicated Chrysippus, it is above all his steadfastness that earned him the name of Stoic.

Let us repeat that last line: ‘it is above all his steadfastness that earned him the name of Stoic’. According to some of his students, Deleuze deserved to be called a Stoic. Hence the title of our book: Deleuze, A Stoic.

Diogenes’ Lives usually include a philosopher’s reported catalogue raisonné. Since most of what is listed there are now lost, we cannot be certain as to whether these works were real or imaginary. In that vein, Bernold’s biography ends with an imaginary or unwritten catalogue raisonné of Deleuze. Let us highlight twelve titles:


As fate would have it, these titles are the main themes of the story of Deleuzian Stoicism. While imaginary, we argue that these themes were expressed in Deleuze’s life, especially in his study of Stoic theory. In a way, our book is an attempt to write these imagined stories and discover Deleuze’s unwritten treatises. To do this, we must locate Stoicism in the context of ancient Greece. For Deleuze, antiquity was a spirited competition among rival philosophical schools, differentiated by their various theoretical orientations for thinking and living. Let us consider the competitors.

**Four Ancient Philosophical Orientations**

A strange surface structures Stoicism. It is strange because it borders on the paradoxical; it is a surface because it acts like a border, boundary, frontier, or limit of bodies. This surface is central to our understanding of Stoicism, and so will wind through the entire text.
Introduction: The Egg

In order to grasp the edges of this strange Stoic surface and pull it within view, let us contrast it with three ancient philosophical orientations: the pre-Socratic, the Platonic and the Aristotelian. In the Conclusion, we will return to these by characterising them as forms of ancient philosophical comedy. According to Deleuze’s playful depiction, pre-Socratics are thinkers of depth, Platonists thinkers of height, Aristotelians thinkers of inwardness, and Stoics thinkers of surface.⁶

To see how the pre-Socratics are thinkers of depths, Deleuze recalls Diogenes Laërtius’ recounting of the legendary death of Empedocles.⁷ As the story goes, Empedocles ‘set out on his way to Etna; then, when he had reached it, he plunged into the fiery craters and disappeared, his intention being to confirm the report that he had become a god’ (DL 8.69). Putting his metaphysics into practice, Empedocles dives deep into the volcano, aiming to sink his body back into the primordial elements of nature from which it was birthed. Deleuze characterises other pre-Socratics, especially the Milesians, as thinkers of depths. The main difference among them is the element each selects as the deepest of the depths: Thales’ water, Anaximenes’ air, Heraclitus’ fire and so forth. Whatever is selected as the most basic element, each posits it as the deepest, darkest, most originary ontological category. This metaphysical orientation enacts a ‘turning below’, a pre-Socratic subversion.⁸

The Platonic axis of thought points the opposite direction. Rather than down towards the depths, Platonic philosophy looks up towards the heights. In the imagery of Plato’s Republic, the ‘philosopher is a being of ascents’, of escaping the cave and climbing up into the light (LS 127).⁹ Even once one has escaped the cave and recognised the shadows for what they really are, the Platonic imperative is to ascend even higher, up the divided line, straining for the height of heights, the light of lights. Hence the Platonic image of the philosopher as the one who strives for the intelligible realm up on high, the uppermost realm of transcendent ideas. ‘Height’, Deleuze writes, ‘is the properly Platonic Orient’ (LS 127). Up there among the clouds, where Aristophanes focuses Socrates’ attention in The Clouds, Plato locates truly true beings. Even among the immaterial forms, there remain even higher rungs to climb. In the Republic, the form of the Good is perched at the top of it all; other dialogues give a certain priority to the forms of the One and Being.¹⁰ Like the sun, situated at the apex of the world, emitting the numen lumen illuminating the bodies strewn about the surface of the earth, the form of the Good causes
the vertical ontological order and upright intelligibility, letting us glimpse true knowledge. Socratic dialectic is an education in how to ascend to the heights, to follow the ‘flight of ideas’. It is a Platonic conversion (LS 128).  

Though Deleuze skips Aristotle in his classification of ancient philosophical orientations, we should consider the Stagarite before considering the Stoics. Aristotelian philosophy is, with two important caveats, generally oriented upward along a vertical chain of being, in so far as he continues to prioritise formal causes. The first caveat is that, for Aristotle, formal principles are never independent of matter; together, form and matter are individuated as compounds. The second caveat is that while formal causes are ‘etiologically prior’ to material causes, Aristotle goes ‘up’ the chain of being to god through efficient, not formal, causes (perhaps because formal causes do not lead to god). The point is that both material and teleological explanations are fundamental to his work, especially in the biological writings. Thus ‘being’ is always individuated in material composites, and is separable only in thought not in fact. In short, every thing and every way of being depends on ὄσια as the primary ‘thing’ and ‘being’. This prioritisation of ὄσια orients Aristotle towards the ‘insides’ of things (for example, ‘nature’ as an inner principle of motion and rest, the priority of activity to potentiality, ὄσια as the primary subject of which other categories are accidents). Aristotle thus ‘takes down’ what was, for Plato, above, placing it within the world’s particulars, and ‘brings up’ the depths of the pre-Socratics. Many scholars call this inwardisation of the heights and depths hylomorphism. The result: interiority or height-within. We call this philosophical operation Aristotelian inwardness.

In contrast to pre-Socratic depth, Platonic height and Aristotle interiority, the Stoics are thinkers of surface. The Stoics do not simply return to the depths of primordial matter, nor do they erect a hierarchy reaching up into the heights of the intellect, either above or within. Instead, they develop a new kind of ontological orientation. ‘Stoicism’, according to Alain Beaulieu, ‘constitutes a paradigmatic model of experimentation of reality independently of reference to primordial elements [of the pre-Socratics], the Idea-forms [of the Platonists], and the prime Mover [of Aristotle].’ Although Deleuze suggests that Plato himself provokes the overturning of Platonism, ‘the Stoics’, Deleuze states, ‘are the first to reverse Platonism’ (DR 68,
Introduction: The Egg

244; *LS* 7). But even this is not quite right. The Stoics do not simply *reverse* Platonism; they *pervert* it, along with their other philosophical predecessors. Stoicism thus initiates a philosophical perversion. Before detailing this, a table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancient school</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Socratics</td>
<td>Depth</td>
<td>Descent</td>
<td>Subversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato/Socrates</td>
<td>Height</td>
<td>Ascent</td>
<td>Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>Interiority</td>
<td>Inward</td>
<td>Inversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoics</td>
<td>Surface</td>
<td>Per-scent¹⁹</td>
<td>Perversion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stoic Perversion**

The pervert is a recurring character in Deleuze’s writings. Consider a few examples from different texts. Deleuze calls Lewis Carroll, one of the driving voices in *Logic of Sense*, ‘a little pervert’, echoing Artaud’s own characterisation (*LS* 84). In *Anti-Oedipus*, the pervert is the one who ‘resisted oedipalization’; the ‘village pervert’ is given a prominent role there too (*AO* 75, 163). In interviews, Deleuze sometimes mentions the ‘polymorphic pervert’. Perhaps most interesting of all is the centrality of perversion in the twelfth issue of Guattari’s journal *Revue Recherches, Three Billion Perverts: The Grand Encyclopedia of Homosexuality*, to which Deleuze anonymously contributed. Its publication caused a scandal in 1973. Immediately upon publication, it was seized, and Félix Guattari, as the director of publications, was fined 600 francs for affronting public decency . . . [It] was judged to constitute a ‘detailed display of depravities and sexual deviations,’ and the ‘libidinous exhibition of a perverted minority.’ All copies of the issue were ordered to be destroyed.

David Lapoujade, Deleuze’s student, appreciates the importance of philosophical perversity in Deleuze. ‘Perversion’, writes Lapoujade, ‘is an essential operation in Deleuze and the pervert a central figure of his philosophy, like the famous “schizo” of *Anti-Oedipus*.’ Following *Anti-Oedipus*’ imagery of a ‘schizophrenic out for a walk’, we can think of the Deleuze’s Stoicism as akin to ‘a pervert out for a walk’ through the Stoa, a different model than that of the neurotic lying on Agathon’s couch in Plato’s *Symposium*. If we seek a ‘breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world’, we find it in
Deleuze’s image of the Stoic as philosophical pervert (AO 2). In Deleuze’s imagery, the perversity specific to Stoicism appears in the ‘new philosophical operation’ that ‘opposes at once Platonic conversion and pre-Socratic subversion’ and we add Aristotelian inversion (LS 133).

Deleuze calls this operation ‘perversion’ in so far as Stoicism ‘befit[s] the system of provocations of this new type of philosopher’ (LS 133). While Platonic ascension and pre-Socratic descension are mere inversions of each other, and Aristotelian inversion a turning of both within, the Stoics do not simply go up or down a vertical axis, nor do they just place them both inside; they instead pervert these vertical philosophical orientations by ‘turning things inside-out’. As Jacques Brunschwig notices, Plato’s Sophist ‘provide[s] the Stoics [with] an argument that they could turn inside-out’. A combination of per (‘through, thoroughly, exceedingly’) + vertere (‘to turn’), etymologically ‘perversion’ is a turning-through such that what was inside is now outside and outside now inside. More than inverting the vertical plane, so that what was formerly above is placed below or vice-versa, the Stoics thoroughly turn the axis of philosophy on its side, creating a flat, smooth surface. ‘One could say’, Deleuze suggests, ‘that the old depth having spread out became width’ (LS 9). Width, rather than height, depth or interiority, is new in Stoicism. The Stoics ‘no longer expect salvation from the depths of the point of departure of an operation that consists neither in negating nor even destroying, but rather in radically contesting the validity of that which is: it suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a way that a new horizon opens up beyond the given and in place of it.

This process of neutralisation is key to perversion and reveals one of its four main logical characteristics: inclusive disjunction.

In order not to abuse the metaphorics of height, depth, inward and surface, we should be precise about what these terms mean. ‘Height’ and ‘inward’ refer to an order of prioritisation, where what is ‘above’ or ‘within’ is prior in relevant ways – ontologically, epistemologically, ethically and so on. Consider the top-heavy vertical hierarchies of Platonic (where first causes perch on the highest rung), the heavy-weighted brute materialism of Empedocles and others (which place what is below, rather than above, first), or the turning-inwards of Aristotelian metaphysics (which locates an essential interiority of things along a vertical chain of being). For all three, it is a question of causation. Prioritising height means prioritising formal and final
causes, prioritising depth means prioritising material and efficient causes, and prioritising interiority means prioritising formal causes individuated as material compounds. The Stoic ‘surface’, however, eliminates these orders of prioritisation in order to collapse the overall organisation of formality and materiality and turn it inside-out. ‘Perversion’, Lapoujade writes, ‘is a critique of all ground [as heights, depths, or interiority] carried out as part of the most zealous search for a ground’, that is, an ungrounding. The surface is the perverse figure of the groundless ground, and the ‘Deleuzian hero is the pervert’. The ‘pervert’, for Lapoujade, ‘is the “structural” hero who escapes the undifferentiated depths of psychosis’ of the pre-Socratics ‘as well as the manic-depressive circles of neurosis’ of Socrates and Plato.

**The Three Parts of Philosophy**

To understand the precise significance of Stoic philosophical perversion, let us pose that famous question of philosophy. What, for the Stoics, should be *first philosophy?* They offer three possibilities: physics, logic and ethics. According to Diogenes Laërtius, Apollodorus calls these ‘Heads of Commonplace’, Chrysippus and Eudromus refer to them as ‘specific divisions’ and others see them as ‘generic divisions’ (DL 7.40). Contemporary French scholar of ancient philosophy Frédérique Ildefonse sees this division as ‘less a question of parts than of place, of species, or of kinds’. The different ‘parts’ of philosophy are thus best thought of as different places or locations in an integrated system. They are integrated Stoic spaces, if we can use topological language. As Ildefonse stresses, this sense of ‘integration’ or ‘integral’ will be essential for the whole Stoic system.

Different Stoics prioritize different topics, and thus start in different places. ‘Diogenes of Ptolemais ... begins with ethics, and Apollodorus puts ethics second; Panaetius and Posidonius start with physics’, while ‘Chrysippus thought that young men should study logic first, ethics second, and afterward physics’ (DL 7.41). While the order of philosophical topics remained a problem to which different Stoics offered different responses, they almost all agree that the three parts are integrated. For the Stoics, ‘no part [of philosophy] is separated from another, but the parts are mixed’ (DL 7.40). In order to explain the exact nature of this mixture, the Stoics compare the tripartite integration of philosophy to various things. They compare it to an *animal*: Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to
the flesh parts, Physics to the soul; to a ‘productive field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the Soil or the trees’; or to ‘a city’, presumably with the infrastructure as the physics, the walls as the logic, and the citizens and laws as the ethics (DL 7.40). For the purposes of this story of the Deleuze–Stoicism encounter that we are telling, we insist on the comparison of philosophy to an egg, as Diogenes writes: ‘Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the albumen, Ethics, and the yolk is Physics’ (DL 7.40). Let us put all these characterisations of the philosophical topics in a table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Fertile field</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Egg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>Soul</td>
<td>Soil or trees</td>
<td>[Infrastructure]</td>
<td>Yolk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic</td>
<td>Bones and sinews</td>
<td>Fence</td>
<td>[Walls and laws]</td>
<td>Shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Fleshy parts</td>
<td>Crop</td>
<td>[Citizens]</td>
<td>Albumen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figure of the egg also plays an essential role in Deleuze’s own writings. To cite only a few examples of this: the egg is the prime example of an intensive field, the ‘Dogon egg’ is the instance of ‘the distribution of intensities’, ‘the body without organs is an egg’, and much more (DR 250–1; ATP 149; AO 19). Most clearly of all, Deleuze repeats claim that ‘The entire world is an egg’ (DR 216, 251). The concept and image of the egg appears in nearly every one of Deleuze’s texts. It is one of the most common conceptual figures in his œuvre.

**The Sage and the Egg**

The ‘Twentieth Series’ of *Logic of Sense* is dedicated to Stoicism. It begins with the passage of Diogenes Laërtius mentioned above, where it emphasises sense of philosophy as an egg. ‘We must imagine’, he writes, ‘a situation in which a student [*disciple*] is posing a question of signification: O master, what is ethics? The Stoic sage then takes out a hard-boiled egg from his reversible cloak [*manteau doublé*] and designates the egg with his staff* (LS 142). This seems confusing, for if only of my students asked me ‘What is ethics?’ and my response was to whip out an egg and point to that, my dean might have a few questions. So, what is going on? Two things.

First, the sage is responding to a question specifically about ethics by pointing to an object – an egg – that is intensively organised.
The point of the imagery of the egg, as with the imagery of the others – animal, fertile field and so forth – is that the parts cannot be completely separated. Without being homogeneous, they are both distinct yet interdependent and interconnected. When we crack an egg, a little of the albumen remains attached to the yolk and a little still sticks to the shell. Similarly, trying to talk about only the albumen, without referring to the yolk or shell, fails, just as trying to talk about only ethics, in isolation from physics and logic, is impossible, or at least misses the complicated yet necessary interrelations among all three. Deleuze knows this: ‘the place of ethics is clearly displayed between the two poles of the superficial, logical shell and the deep physical yolk’ \(^{37}\) (LS 142). Unlike Modern Philosophy’s clean divisions between the domain of truth, beauty and goodness, or epistemology, aesthetics and morality, the Stoics considered the parts of philosophy as necessarily integrated. Ethical theory has a direct, albeit oblique, connection to physics and logic, and the same goes among all parts. Just as the parts of an egg are distinct yet inseparable from each other, so are the parts of Stoic philosophy. Deleuze appreciates that there is, in Stoicism, ‘an ethics of . . . physics’, and we can fill out the rest of the relations: an ethics of logic; a physics of ethics and a physics of logic; a logic of ethics and a logic of physics.

The second reason, which resonates with the first, for pointing to an egg in response to the student’s ontological question about ethics – What is ethics? – is that the Stoic sage answers with a body. Rather than just responding with words and theory, the sage trains the student to consider matter first. As we will see, this rhythm of moving from words to bodies and back again is the adventure of becoming a Stoic. Deleuze likens this to Alice’s adventures in Lewis Carroll’s Wonderland, which ‘consists of climbing back from the depth of bodies to the surface of words and back to bodies’ (LS 142). Moreover, not only are the Stoics thoroughgoing materialists, they are the ancient thinkers who pushed philosophical commitments to matter further than anyone else, and it is this excessive push that makes Stoicism perverse. Hence we call Stoic theory a perverse materialism, or what Claude Imbert calls ‘empiricism unhinged’.\(^{38}\)

The Stoic sage points to an egg in order to orient the student of Stoicism to the bodies composing the cosmos and, we will see, to the incorporeals required by a thoroughgoing materialism. If Alice is the Stoic apprentice, Deleuze asks perversely, ‘[i]s not Humpty Dumpty himself the Stoic master?’ (LS 142).
The Yolk, the Shell and the Albumen

Like that ovoid riddler from Lewis Carroll’s *Alice Through the Looking-Glass* and like the Stoics’ reported characterisation of their own philosophical system, our text is structured like an egg. ‘The Yolk’ is Part I: Physics, ‘The Shell’ Part II: Logic, and ‘The Albumen’ Part III: Ethics. Each part divides into three subparts. Part I: Physics divides into ‘The Yolk A: Stoic Metaphysics’, ‘The Yolk B: Incorporeals’ and ‘The Yolk C: Space’. Part II: Logic divides into ‘The Shell A: Λεκτα’, ‘The Shell B: The Paradoxes’ and ‘The Shell C: Living Logic’. Part III: Ethics divides into ‘The Albumen A: Time’, ‘The Albumen B: The Act’ and ‘The Albumen C: Eternal Recurrence’. This three-part intensive ovoid structure resonates with Deleuze’s writings in so far as his *Logic of Sense*, the text on which we will focus most, is full of such structures. To list a few, there are the three dimensions of the proposition (denotation, manifestation, signification), three stages of the genesis of language (primary order, secondary organisation, tertiary ordinance), three phases of dynamic genesis (connective, conjunctive, disjunctive), three languages (real language, ideal language, esoteric language), and so on.

Yet the most important reason why our text is divided into these three parts of the egg is in order to make a heterodoxical claim concerning what Deleuze deems the most perverse concepts in Stoics: the incorporeal [ασώματα]. While we will fully explain what an incorporeal is in Part I: ‘The Yolk B’, we can now say that in Stoic metaphysics there are two basic types of something: corporeals [σώματα] and incorporeals. *Something* is the broadest metaphysical category in Stoic theory. Corporeals and incorporeals are differentiated by metaphysical modalities: corporeals *exist*, incorporeals *subsist*. Corporeals are bodies in depth and incorporeals subsist as that strange surface that runs through all Stoicism. It is this dual insistence on corporeality and incorporeality that makes Stoic theory not just a materialism but a perverted materialism.

According to the orthodox scholarly interpretation, there were four types of incorporeals in Stoicism: void, place, λεκτα (roughly: meaning or sense) and time. Contrary to everyone, however, we make a heterodoxical claim: *there are three, not four, incorporeals*. While it will take the entire book to sufficiently support this claim, we will show that Deleuze’s Stoicism articulates the following as the three incorporeals: space, λεκτα and time. Each of these three incorporeals is studied by each of the three parts in our book: Physics
Introduction: The Egg

studies space, Logic studies ἄκτα and Ethics studies time. Here is a table so that we can picture our path through our book:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Egg parts</th>
<th>Incorporeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>Yolk</td>
<td>Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic</td>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>ἄκτα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Albumen</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part I is about Stoic physics and metaphysics, especially in so far as it is considered *perverse*. ‘The Yolk A’ situates Stoic metaphysics by articulating ‘something’, τι, as the broadest metaphysical category for the Stoics. As we will see, ‘something’ divides into two basic types: corporeals and incorporeals. This distinction is a perverse response to a distinction from Plato’s *Sophist*, which is intended to distinguish the two sides of the Stoic incorporeal surface. We then consider the nuanced meaning of the incorporeals’ metaphysical modality – subsistence – before situating all of Stoic metaphysics as the first self-consciously articulated *system*, σύστημα. Deleuze’s main contribution here is to articulate the difference between the two sides of the strange Stoic surface as composed of an extensive face and an intensive face, and integration and differentiation are their respective operations. ‘The Yolk B’ focuses directly on the Stoics’ concept of incorporeality, with a special emphasis on distinguishing corporeals as bodily causes from incorporeals as both effects and yet quasi-causes. Since this concept of a ‘quasi-cause’ is so confusing and elusive, we will trace it back to its first appearance in the writings of Clement of Alexandria. We then consider how quasi-cause operates as what Deleuze calls ‘static genesis’, which contrasts with corporeal dynamic genesis, thus revealing a kind of double causality in Stoic metaphysics. To understand this double causality we uncover in Deleuze a hidden twist of Immanuel Kant’s Table of Judgements, which allows us to develop two metaphysical logics: a formal logic of bodies that corresponds to one side of the incorporeal surface, and a transcendental logic of incorporeals that corresponds to the other side. This latter logic follows four classes: (1) infinite, (2) singular, (3) disjunctive and (4) problematic. ‘The Yolk C’ concludes Part I by making our argument for our heterodoxical claim: there are three, not four, incorporeals. In Stoic physics, this claim is made by collapsing the canonical incorporeals – place and void – into just one – space. We will offer three reasons and three advantages for
this heterodoxy. To articulate space in Stoicism, we consider the technical meanings of several related terms (such as ‘whole’, ‘all’, ‘infinite divisibility’) before turning directly to Stoic place and void, which we contrast with Aristotelian place and atomic void. We argue that the Stoics were the first to isolate a single notion of space, and space is the single incorporeal in so far as it is composed of place and void. Place and void are different ways of considering space: place is the extensive side facing bodies and void the intensive side facing away from bodies. We finish ‘The Yolk C’ by showing that the same double-sided structure of the incorporeal surface, which appears as space when considered from the perspective of physics, repeats when that surface is considered by logic and by ethics. From a logical point of view, the surface is \( \lambda e k t a \), and is composed of two faces: the extensive side consists of conjugated verbs and the intensive side consists of infinitive verbs. Isomorphically, considering the surface from an ethical point of view the surface is time, and it too is composed of two sides: the extensive side consists of a kind of time called chronos and the intensive side consists of a kind of time called aion.

Part II turns to Stoic logic and philosophy of language. ‘The Shell A’ begins by considering the history and etymology of the ancient concept: \( \lambda e k t a \). With \( \lambda e k t a \), the Stoics create a theory of attributes that contrasts with Platonic predicates. \( \lambda e k t a \) is how the Stoics explain the genesis of linguistic meaning or sense out of meaningless matter, which Deleuze calls ‘a final task’ in so far as it applies to all materialist philosophies. Deleuze here helps us take up this final task through several Deleuzian concepts from his philosophy of language: primary order, secondary organisation and tertiary ordinance, as well as the three dimensions of the circle of the proposition (denotation, manifestation and signification). Linguistic meaning, we will see, is generated out of meaningless matter through two geneses: dynamic and static. After comparing Epicurean and Stoic philosophies of language, we conclude ‘The Shell A’ by claiming that \( \lambda e k t a \) is the Stoic incorporeal considered from the perspective of logic, and it is composed to two opposed sides: the extensive side facing bodes corresponds to conjugated verbs (such as ‘I cut’, ‘he cut’, ‘she has cut’ and so on) and the intensive side facing away corresponds to infinitive verbs (such as ‘to cut’ or ‘to walk’). ‘The Shell B’ considers the importance of paradoxes in Stoic logic, specifically in so far as they pervert good and common sense. We then see how the Stoics brilliantly developed a new logic in antiquity: a propositional system that is a logical alternative to Aristotelian categorical logic. Given
these innovations, the Stoics were especially interested in the force of paradoxes. Paradoxes are, we will see, absurd, and there are three dimensions of absurdity, corresponding to the three dimensions of the circle of the proposition. Paradoxes are important for materialists like the Stoics and Deleuze because they are the means for accounting for genesis of language and logic. To see this precisely, we articulate four classic Stoic paradoxes: The Heap, The Liar, The Master and The Nobody. Each of these express the structure of ambiguity: a double-sided structure that turns on what Deleuze calls the ‘aleatory point’. We close our story of Stoic paradoxes by considering two forms of inference: *ergo* is cognitive deduction involved in propositional logic and *igitur* is the production of cognition through the Stoic art of paradoxes. ‘The Shell C’ uses the results from the previous chapters in order to construct a *Handbook of Paradoxes*. Logical handbooks have a long tradition in Stoicism, the goal of which was not simply to improve at formal logic but to train students to create concepts for living. In this tradition, we write a *Handbook of Paradoxes*, which consists of four acts: Infinite Act, Singular Act, Disjunctive Act and Problematic Act. These four correspond to the four paradoxes from the four classes from the Transcendental Logic of Incorporeals we sketched out in ‘The Yolk B’: (1) infinite, (2) singular, (3) disjunctive and (4) problematic. Deleuze notices a profound link between Stoic logic and ethics, and constructing our *Handbook* expresses this profound link and thus prepares for Part III: Ethics.

Part III closes our book with an account of Stoic ethics. To avoid as much disappointment as possible, let us clarify what we mean by ‘ethics’. Ethics, for Deleuze’s Stoicism, does not refer to the traditions of normative theory or applied morality, which mostly focus on issues of right and wrong, virtue and vice, good and evil. We, instead, begin from the perspective of time, ontology and action in order to read, later on, the more traditional moral question. This is why ‘Albumen A’ considers time the third and final incorporeal. We first contrast Stoic time with Platonic time and Aristotelian time. While some scholars are confused by the presence of two seemingly incompatible theories of time in Stoic writings, which Victor Goldschmidt calls aion and chronos, the Deleuze’s Stoicism sees aion and chronos as two sides of a single incorporeal surface: time. We distinguish these sides through their different senses of the present: the chronological now and the aionic instant. We then consider the twisted genealogy of chronos and aion, before articulating how time also has that same strange double-sided structure: chronos is the extensive side of facing
limited and determinate bodies, and aion is the intensive side facing away from bodies. ‘Albumen B’ considers the status of an ethical act given time’s double-sided surface structure. To do this, we consider the event of dying, specifically the suicides of Seneca and Deleuze. We then take up Deleuze’s consideration that chronos and aion correspond to two methods of interpretation (divination and usage of representations), two moral attitudes (cosmic perspective and singular perspective) and two ethical tasks (counter-actualisation and actualisation). We concretise all of this in the figure of the Stoic sage, Deleuze’s select example of which is the Surrealist poet Joe Bousquet. Through the ‘Bousquet proposition’, which concerns the fated nature of the poet’s wound, we find that the act and the event are the same paradoxical object, viewed either from one side (the act) or the other (the event), and counter-actualisation is the ethical task that corresponds to the act. Here we will see what is involved in ‘how to make oneself a Stoic’ in so far as it entails a principle of amor fati. In ‘Albumen C’ we take up Deleuze’s suggestion that there are two eternal returns, corresponding to the two methods of interpretation, two moral attitudes and two ethical tasks we detailed in ‘Albumen B’. After giving a short history of the Stoic doctrine of the cosmic conflagration, we take inspiration from Nietzsche’s seemingly disingenuous authorship of eternal recurrence through two short stories by Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote’ and ‘Death and the Compass’. These stories articulate the difference between the two eternal returns: the cyclical return of chronos and the return as the straight line of aion. These two forms of the eternal return express the paradox of action, which combines the ethical imperative to act and the impossibility of acting because of the Stoic insistence on fate. Following Deleuze’s lead, we close the book by considering the ‘crack-up’ of the American writer F. Scott Fitzgerald and what he calls ‘laughing Stoicism’.

In the ‘Conclusion’ we return to the four ancient philosophical orientations given above in order to articulate corresponding forms of philosophical comedy. Slapstick is the comedic form of pre-Socratic depths, irony of Socratic/Platonic heights, sarcasm of Cynic rawness, wit of Aristotelian inwardness and humour of Stoicism. Stoic humour, we will see, seems perverse in comparison to the other ancient comedic forms (except Cynicism). After viewing Stoic humour through the American comedian Steve Martin’s stand-up routines from the 1970s, we end this tale of the Deleuze–Stoic encounter by showing that Stoic humour is the proper philosophical
Introduction: The Egg

response to the paradox of action and the course of fate. As we turn that final page and close the book, we should hear the echoes of what Deleuze considers a species of laughter that comes from one who speaks of freedom and power: the laughter of Spinoza.

French Stoicism

To tell the story of Deleuze, a Stoic, we consider the ideas and writings of Deleuze’s teachers and students, or the prior and the subsequent generations of French philosophers of Stoicism.

The person who shaped Deleuze’s encounter with Stoicism most significantly was Émile Bréhier (1876–1952), the influential French scholar of the history of philosophy. Who is Bréhier? Early in life, Bréhier fought in the First World War, where he lost his left arm in battle, and became a Commander in the French Legion of Honour. Later, he studied under Henri Bergson, was a classmate of the great poet Charles Péguy, and in 1944 succeeded Bergson as the Chair of Philosophy at the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, serving until Gabriel Marcel took over in 1952. Before then, he taught around France (Laval, Beauvais, Rennes, Bordeaux), as well as in Egypt and Brazil. In addition to Stoicism, Bréhier’s scholarship engaged with Philo of Alexandria, Plotinus, F. W. J. Schelling, and he produced a massive four-volume Histoire de la philosophie. Evidence of his influence on French philosophy is clear. For example, he directed Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s thesis, and his Histoire de la philosophie allemande had an impact on the work of Georges Bataille. In our text we will focus on his work on Stoicism, with a special emphasis on his 1907 doctoral thesis: La Théorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoïcisme (The Theory of Incorporeals in Ancient Stoicism). We seek to extract the fuller story of Deleuze’s Stoic lessons from Bréhier.

The other older philosopher working in early twentieth-century France who greatly shaped Deleuze’s understanding of Stoicism was Victor Goldschmidt (1914–71), who was about a decade older than Deleuze. Born in Berlin, Goldschmidt moved to France in 1933, although he never lived in Paris. Instead, he worked at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique and later taught at the universities at Rennes, Clermont-Ferrand and, finally, at what he liked to call ‘the smallest university in France, Amiens’. Goldschmidt was inclined towards philology and the classic forms of the history of philosophy. His first book, Essai sur le Cratyle, was the first to
prove the Pythagorean influence on Plato.\textsuperscript{44} He studied with George Dumezil and wrote his doctoral thesis on Plato’s Dialogues under the direction of Bréhier (1945). He wrote important works on Descartes, Rousseau, Epicurus, Aristotle and others, although we are most interested in his 1953 book \textit{Le Système stoïcien et l'idée de temps} (The Stoic System and the Idea of Time) because it clearly inspired Deleuze’s encounter with Stoicism, especially the two senses of time: chronos and aion. Goldschmidt’s own encounter with Stoicism and ancient philosophy was shaped by his teacher Martial Gueroult, who conveyed the ‘structural method’\textsuperscript{45}.

Deleuze’s Stoicism does not end with Deleuze’s relationship with the ancient Stoics, or with those the older generation of French philosophers who taught Deleuze his Stoicism, but spills into the next generation of French thinkers, post-Deleuze, who are now premiere French scholars of Stoicism. In Part I: Physics we engage with Goldschmidt’s student Jacques Brunschwig. Throughout our book we engage the works of Frédérique Ildefonse, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat and Thomas Benatouïl. While they all consider Deleuze in one form or another, Benatouïl was actually part of ‘a small group of young philosophers at ENS [École normale supérieure] . . . [who] had discovered Deleuze and Guattari and found their work entirely out of sync with their period’.\textsuperscript{46} While the older Brunschwig has been recognised by many English-speaking scholars of antiquity and had several essays translated, these younger French philosophers are still relatively unknown in British and American scholarship. We hope that this book might be part of an introduction to their work. The complete story of the \textit{Deleuze, A Stoic} thus spreads out to a time before and after Deleuze, and we aim to tell that story as fully as possible.

\textbf{Double-Sided Surface}

Since this strange, double-sided surface structures the perspective from which this story unfolds, our focus will be equally strange and double. At various points, our focus will slip back and forth, from one side to the other. The effect will be a telling of one story from two perspectives: (1) the perspective of Stoic philosophy to which is added a Deleuzian reading, and (2) a Deleuzian reading of Stoic philosophy that is heterodoxical to other readers of Stoicism. In short, we offer heterodoxical readings of Stoicism by means of, yet not reducible to, Deleuze’s own reading of the Stoics. The goal of
telling a single story told from two simultaneous perspectives for both Stoic and Deleuzean scholarship is to contribute to the uncovering of a relatively ignored tradition in philosophical materialism so as to generate momentum for future materialisms. While the Stoics and Deleuze individually contribute to this momentum, combining them in this strange way generates something new, something that could only result from placing both stories together so as to form a single, double-sided surface.

We might thus call this a ‘materially focused history of philosophy’ in order to place it among recent continental readings of ancient philosophy, such as my co-edited volume *Continental Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics* and my monograph *The Deleuze–Lucretius Encounter*, as well as other Edinburgh University Press authors, such as Thomas Nail’s ongoing trilogy on Lucretius. Such continental philosophies, especially those inspired by Deleuze, offer new ways of engaging antiquity that differ from at least three more standard readings of the history of philosophy. First are the ‘returns’ to antiquity, which assume an account of history as a decline that needs saving by returning to its origins. We consider such histories too nostalgic for our and messianic for our tastes. Second are the ‘historicist’ readings, which restrict themselves to a historical context so greatly that they ignore the efficacy of texts to generate ideas beyond that specific context. We consider historicity readings too static or stuck because they overlook the dynamism of a text to generate new concepts today. Finally there is ‘reception studies’. Similar to historicism, reception studies treats new figures like past figures, rather than seeing all figures as alive and as potential contributors to the philosophical exigencies of the present and future. Our disagreement here is that they focus too much about clarifying rather than producing new concepts and ways of living.

Contrary to these three, a materially focused history of philosophy takes up a major continental philosopher who engages with an ancient figure, such as Deleuze on Lucretius or Malabo on Plato, in order to unearth a conceptual dynamism that is already there but remains unexploited. These dynamisms generate effects that are indeterminable in advance, and only appear through encounters with them. We thus place this book in a materialist tradition that is based on productivity because it is attuned to the ways in which the canon of philosophy shapes the contemporary scene by prioritising questions and problems over answers and puzzles. In our eyes, the canon is not a set and fixed linear story, but a distinct provocative
DELEUZE, A STOIC

geography structured by sites of contestations. The geography of this story is the double-sided surface. The focus of *Deleuze, A Stoic* is a materially focused history of philosophy from a continental angle, as admittedly strange at it is.

**Notes**

1. ‘The biography of a philosopher or literary figure was often placed at the beginning of an edition of his works, but it could also circulated independently, or as part of a collection of biographies of individual figures.’ Jaap Mansfeld, *Prolegomena: Questions to Be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 6.


4. Bernold was also a student of Jacques Derrida, and a one of the few intimate friends of Samuel Beckett. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/dec/29/becketts-friendship-andre-bernold-nicholas-lezard (last accessed 8 February 2018).


6. Deleuze does not include Aristotle in this depiction, but we will introduce a Deleuzian account of Aristotelianism in order to put this picture into conversation with another of the traditions of ancient philosophy: the Peripatetics.


8. In the hopes of putting this text into conversation with other contemporary continental philosophy, we can align these ancient philosophical orientation with the division that Graham Harman provides in the first chapter of *The Quadruple Object*. What we are calling Pre-Socratic sub-
version would be akin to Harman’s ‘overmining’ of objects, as Harman too identifies this strategy with Thales, Anaximenes, Democritus, and others. For Harman, subversion ‘undermine[s] objects as the root of philosophy’ because ‘objects are too specific to deserve the name of ultimate reality’; put differently, ‘objects are a sort of derivative product’ because they are ‘too shallow to be the fundamental reality in the universe.’ Graham Harman, _The Quadruple Object_ (Zero Books, 2011), 10.

9. It is not surprising that Plato’s thinking of Being as unified and transcendent depends greatly on a prior thinker of heights – Parmenides – who was carried by the daughters of Helios, the sun god, into the high home of the goddess. That being said, some scholars argue that the goddess in Parmenides’ poem is actually Night. For example, see John Palmer, _Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 51–62.

10. This theory appears in Plato, e.g., _Phaedrus_ 247c, _Sophist_ 246b, 247b–c, _Statesman_ 286a, _Republic_ 5.476a.

11. Continuing with Harman’s analysis from _The Quadruple Object_, Platonic conversion is a philosophical strategy of overmining. Harman writes that a ‘different way of dismissing objects is . . . to reduce them upward rather than downward. Instead of saying that objects are too shallow to be real, it is said that they are too deep. Although he associates overmining with empiricists, he also sees it in ‘post-Kantian anti-realists’, the ‘idealism of Berkeley’ or sceptical agnosticism (11). These three, taken together, resonate strongly with Platonic conversion in so far as ‘these positions overmine the object, treating it as a useless substratum easily replaced by direct manifestations’, such as grasping of ideal Forms (12).


13. We here ignore Aristotle’s god, which is not a form.

14. This is why it is inaccurate to call formal causes ‘immaterial’.


16. Continuing to align our Deleuzian organization with Harman’s, Aristotelian inwardness or interiority is akin to Harman’s own version of object-oriented project, as Harman himself notices: ‘Only with Aristotle do individual objects first become the central player in philosophy.’ Harman, _The Quadruple Object_, 17. The ‘theories of Aristotle’, Harman continues, ‘can all be called theories of substance. The object-oriented philosophy proposed in this book is the latest theory in the same lineage’, although he admits that ‘the theory proposed here is significantly weirder’. Harman, _The Quadruple Object_, 18.

17. Alain Beaulieu, ‘Deleuze et les Stoïciens’, in Alain Beaulieu and Manola

18. While Harman’s undermining aligns with pre-Socratic subversion, his overmining with Platonic conversation, and his object-oriented philosophy with Aristotelian inwardness, he does not have a place for Stoic perversion. Before considering himself a sort of contemporary ‘weird’ Aristotelian, Harman does address (and dismiss) ‘materialism’, which is a combination of overmining and undermining, he does not engage with the perverted materialism of the Stoics. Since the Stoics are not brute materialists, they sidestep his critiques of materialism in so far as they are not simply combining overmining and undermining but instead making what we might call a lateral or horizontal move; this move addresses the problems that Harman sees in pre-Socratic undermining not with overmining but with their strange surface. In my research, I have only seen Harman mention the Stoics once, when he contrasted ‘[Ian] Bogost’s ethics of play’ with Stoic ethics. Graham Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything (London: Pelican Books, 2018), 223–4. But he never mentions Stoic physics, logic or the perverse parts of their ethics. While Harman appreciates weirdness, he does not seem to have a time for perversion. We should wonder what he would say about the Stoics’ perverse materialism.

19. ‘Perscend’ is a neologism combined of per (‘through, along’ or ‘thoroughly, exceedingly’) plus scandere (‘to climb, mount, clamber’), thus meaning something like ‘to climb along exceedingly’ or ‘to move thoroughly through’.

20. Lapoujade claims that ‘the figure of the pervert appears everywhere in Deleuze’s writings’ while he was working on Logique du sens. David Lapoujade, Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (2014), trans. Joshua David Jordan (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2017), 143–4.


24. Lapoujade, Aberrant Movements, 25. In this vein, we are trying to do with ‘pervert’ what Deleuze and Guattari did with ‘schizo’.

Introduction: The Egg


27. As is the case with many of Deleuze’s concepts, this is not the final word on ‘depth’. In different contexts, ‘depth’ comes to mean something very different from what it does here. For an engaging account of other meanings of ‘depth’ in Deleuze, one that connects Deleuze to Merleau-Ponty, see Henry Somers-Hall, *Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 170–4.


33. We can hear echoes of Stoics’ fertile field in Deleuze’s sense of intensive field: ‘The vital egg is nevertheless already a field of individuation, and the embryo is a pure individual, and the one in the other testifies to the primacy of individuation over actualisation’ (DR 250).

34. An image of the Dogon egg marks the beginning of Chapter 6, ‘November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?’


36. In addition to *Anti-Oedipus*, *A Thousand Plateaus*, *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*, it appears in the ‘interview’ and collections (*Desert Islands*, *Two Regimes of Madness*, *Negotiations*, *Dialogues*, *Essays Critical and Clinical*), as well as *The Fold*, *Cinema I* and *II*, *What is Philosophy?*, *Francis Bacon*, *Kafka* and *Masochism*.

37. I translated the three instances of the French *jaune* (167) as ‘yolk’ rather than ‘yoke’ (142, 143), which is Mark Lester’s English translation of *Logique du sens*. Unless this is a sophisticated point that goes over my head, I assume it is just an unfortunate translation mistake. The French for ‘yoke’ would be something like *joug*, which is not the word Deleuze uses.


40. Ibid. 41.

44. Ibid.