Violence in Islamic Thought from the Mongols to European Imperialism

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Examines the development of Muslim theological, legal, literary and cultural discussions about violence and its legitimation.

The violent conquest of the eastern part of the lands under Muslim rule by the Mongols marked a new period in the history of Islamic civilisation and in attitudes towards violence. This volume examines the various intellectual and cultural reactions of Muslim thinkers to these events, both within and beyond the territories subjected to Mongol control. Each chapter examines how violent acts were assessed by Muslim intellectuals, analysing both changes and continuity in Islamic thought over time.

Each chapter is structured around a case study in which violent acts are justified or condemned, revealing the variety of attitudes to violence in the medieval period. They are framed by a detailed introduction, focusing on theoretical perspectives on violence and religion and their application – or otherwise – to medieval Islam.

Key Features

- Examines the portrayal of violence in a variety of Muslim intellectual contexts (historical, philosophical, theological, legal, literary, artistic)
- Employs a broad understanding of violence – from warfare between Muslims (and between Muslims and others) to individual acts of violence
- Enables a better-informed debate about the nature of violence in Islamic thought, and how the positions developed in early Islam were both used and abandoned by later writers
- Positions these classical conceptions of violence and its justification in Islamic thought in the broader methodological debate over violence and its relationship with religious thought

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Cover image: Ali killing an enemy with dhul-faqar sword. Khaveranname, Iran, 882 ah, Teheran
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VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT
FROM THE MONGOLS TO
EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM
This three-volume series examines the promotion and condemnation of violence in Islamic thought from the earliest period of Islam to the present day. Asking how violence has been justified by Muslims in the past and in the present, these studies show how violence has been legitimised, normalised or censured by Muslims, tracing the history of the argumentation across time and between regions and traditions. The stale media debate about Islam as a violent or non-violent religion is here rejected in favour of a nuanced approach which examines a variety of intellectual disciplines and literatures, examining how violence was processed by Muslim thinkers, such as scholars of law and religion, historians, poets and artists, through time. The result is a striking variety of approaches to violence, and a diversity of conceptions of legitimate and illegitimate violent acts. The series aims to alter how the relationship between violence and Islam is characterised both within and outside of academia.

Volume 1: Violence in Islamic Thought from the Qur’ān to the Mongols
Volume 2: Violence in Islamic Thought from the Mongols to European Imperialism
Volume 3: Violence in Islamic Thought from European Imperialism to the Post-Colonial Era

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VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT FROM THE MONGOLS TO EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM

EDITED BY ROBERT GLEAVE AND ISTVÁN T. KRISTÓ-NAGY

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DATES AND ABBREVIATIONS

All sole dates are according to the Christian (milādī) calendar. When in pairs, the dates are ordered hijrī/milādī, unless there is a specific reference of shamsī for a hijrī shamsī date (as SH). The various editions of the Encyclopedia of Islam (published by Brill) are abbreviated to EI1, EI2 and EI3 in the notes, with full online references (with weblinks) given in the bibliography. Encyclopedia Iranica (various publishers, but available online) is abbreviated to EIr in the notes, with full online references given in the bibliography.
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Introducción

Robert Gleave* y István T. Kristó-Nagy**

La legitimidad, cuando es challenged, basa su apelación en el pasado, mientras que la justificación se refiere a un fin que se encuentra en el futuro. La violencia puede ser justificable, pero nunca será legítima.1

La implicación de la distinción bien-known de Hannah Arendt es que la acción legítima debe hacerse conforme a un código normativo existente; por el contrario, la justificación se basa en los resultados del acto, que se ven como sirviendo un fin más elevado o objetivo. Su argumento más amplio es, por supuesto, que el cálculo consequentialista que justifica las acciones individuales de violencia nunca puede neutralizar su eficacia fundamental. Para Arendt, llevar a cabo el medio o el mal necesario es nunca legítimo (es decir, nunca se ajusta a su idea implícita de un código normativo existente, fundamental), porque para ella, un código moral verdaderamente racional nunca puede describir la violencia como algo bueno o justo. Puede ser justificable (o, de manera más circunstancialmente justificable), pero esta clasificación siempre es temporal y resulta impuesta; no establece un precedente y no tiene ‘apelo del pasado’ para su validación. Incluso en el frente de una gran maldad, un acto de violencia, para Arendt, nunca será puramente bueno. El aporte de Arendt es una contribución reciente en una larga historia de la evaluación ética de la violencia. En el pensamiento europeo, estas divisiones, en parte por...

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least, created the twin disciplines of law and politics. The distinctions she draws between justifiable contraventions of a moral code and allowable exceptions to the law would, however, be quite familiar to the ethical discussions of medieval Muslim authors. They are mirrored, to an extent, in the difference between shārī‘ (divine law) and siyāsah (pragmatic requirements of governance) in medieval Muslim discourse, where the term siyāsah brackets extra-legal (non-shārī‘) actions, justified primarily on consequentialist grounds. That is, they bring benefits to the community, and these must sometimes overrule the (apparent) requirements of the shārī‘. It is important to remember, in contrast to Arendt’s framework, violent acts can be found in both shārī‘ and siyāsah categories, and hence they may be (using her terms) legitimate or justifiable (or indeed both).

This book consists of a series of studies about violent acts in Muslim contexts, whether they were carried out by Muslims or by others, whether they are postulated or actual, whether they have happened, are happening currently or they may take place in the future. The authors of the studies collected here review and analyse the descriptions and assessments of these acts using a broad historical time frame, from Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century CE, to the eve of serious European intervention in the Muslim world in the eighteenth century. Importantly, these violent acts are recorded in compositions (from prosaic documents, to scholarly texts, to works of art), and hence sometimes the discussion cannot be around violence itself alone, but must incorporate how it was represented. It has almost become a fundamental principle in humanities research, now, that the recording of an event encodes an assessment of it. For you, the reader of these studies, a fundamental research question would be whether the representation of these acts of violence (be it textually or visually) is special – by which I mean: do Muslim authors, when describing violent acts, present them as unusual, peculiar and different from other actions, and therefore subject to specific religious, moral and legal assessment? Does violence occupy a special moral category for Muslim writers through history, which sets violent acts apart from other, more commonplace activities? The possible peculiarity of Muslim assessments of violence was a preoccupation of the Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Islamic Thought (LIVIT) research project, of which this collection is but one product. It forms, then, the larger enquiry through which the various case-study examples presented here can be read.

There are, of course, a series of methodological assumptions within this exercise. First, the notion of what constitutes violence in any instance is left
unarticulated (although, in the first volume, we used the working definition of ‘any detrimental act performed by a living being against another living being’), and this, as we know, has been the subject of quite some debate in secondary literature from various disciplinary perspectives.³ Apart from the debate over whether the term violence always implies negativity morally (hinted at in Arendt’s discussion), there is also the breadth of the term’s application. It is generally linked to the notion of harm; primarily physical, but non-physical forms of violence have come to the fore in discussions of late. It can also be linked, both etymologically and conceptually, to the idea of violation. That is, acts of violence illegitimately cross over a person’s natural boundary; in this sense, we can say that the victim has been violated.⁴ The sanctity of the individual, and the assumption of a right of personal self-determination, underpin these notions of violence and one, perhaps questionable, result is that it becomes difficult for self-harm to be viewed as a form of violence. Is violence restricted to physical acts, or can mental or psychological violence be included? Is sexual violence somehow distinctive from other forms of violence, and requires different moral processing? In general, we have allowed each author to work out their own use of the term, either explicitly or implicitly (i.e., through the term’s use in the course) of their analysis. We recognise, however, that the larger theoretical question remains in need of attention.

Second, there is a tricky question of whether the compositions (and their creators) analysed in the following chapters themselves have a notion akin to ideas associated with the English term ‘violence’. Violence may be a useful category of analysis for contemporary academics; was it useful as a category for the creative minds with whose compositions we are engaging? Is there a danger of either the anachronistic application of the terms (and their implicit assessments) or, worse, the imposition of conceptions external to a tradition upon the tradition? Ironically, such impositions have themselves been termed intellectually ‘violent’ acts in the modern debate.⁵ While we have not been doctrinaire about what

³. The literature here is extensive, but interesting accessible recent contributions are by S. Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London, 2008) and R. Bessel, Violence: A Modern Obsession (London, 2015). See also the engaging project www.historiesofviolence.com (accessed 14 December 2016) where the key areas of the current debate are communicated through lectures, podcasts and literature reviews.

⁴. This is most extensively explored in relation to sexual violence, which deserves extensive and separate treatment on its own, and forms one element of the forthcoming Understanding Shari’a: Perfect Past Imperfect Present project (2016–18) funded by Humanities in the European Research Area ‘Uses of the Past’ Programme, based at the University of Exeter.

⁵. The most obvious example of the expansion of violence along these lines is G. Spivak’s
counts as violence, there remains the question of whether violence, however we describe it, can be usefully employed within the study of Muslim civilisation, given that there is no obvious term or notion in the intellectual milieu we address in this volume. We will return to this issue in the introduction to the third and final volume in the series. One could add that the notions of legitimate and justifiable, as used by Arendt and others, reflect a broader tradition of debate around law, expediency and the state that does not neatly fit with the world view of the writers, theologians, historians and artists analysed in the following chapters.

Finally, the periodisation used here is, in some ways, synthetic; are the Mongol invasions an artificial initiating point for such a collection? Is there something methodologically suspect in first creating a time period and then enforcing a unified framework for the analysis of these violent phenomena? These are important questions, and addressing them simply by appealing to convenience (‘well we had to begin and end somewhere’) may be in part true, but it is not necessarily justifiable. The framework of the series (Qur’ān–Mongols; Mongols–European–Imperialism; ‘Modern’) is like Marshall Hodgson’s periodisation in its division into three parts, but unlike it in that our focus is on violence. These are certainly handy for us: we had funding for three conferences; we had a publishing contract for three books; and we had three sets of papers – the periodisation naturally fell into place. But there is also a more conceptual justification – the marker points for beginnings and ends of the three volumes represent disputed, but nonetheless emblematic acts of violence: the career of the Prophet and the early Muslim conquests, the Mongol invasions and the onset of European imperialism. Violence was hardwired into the process of political change, and hence had to be incorporated into the new cultural landscape that flowed from it. It seems defensible (perhaps even appropriate) then to identify these events of political, violent change as the time markers for a collection such as this. This is particularly true given that a major focus of the first section of this volume is how Muslim writers, historians and others came to terms with the transformation effected by the Mongols. This may not constitute a full justification, but it does establish the time-markers we have chosen as at least potentially appropriate. While the questions raised by this (and the other) assumptions may not be resolved in the
Introduction

studies collected here, there is at least an awareness of how they may limit the applicability of the conclusions reached in the following chapters.

RG
Exeter
December 2016

* * * *

‘We are with the winners.’
Ibn ‘Umar (d. 73/693)7

This second volume of our series investigates change and continuity in attitudes towards violence in Islamic thought after the Mongol conquest. The latter clearly brought change. Previously, Muslims had considered the miraculous military success of their armies a proof of the veracity of their religion and a sign of God’s support. While Shi’ism and Khārijism were (in the main) characterised by anti-establishment sentiments and managed to develop ideological frameworks for both the situations of power and out of it, Sunnis mostly saw themselves as the victorious community of God. Sunnism (that is, the Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamā’a) was also seeking the unity of the Muslim community and tended to legitimise rulers of any origin in order to maintain peace and the established order. The Mongols, however, were not Muslims, and their conquest of more than half of the lands that had been under Muslim rule produced for Muslims an existential fear and a deep ideological crisis.

Massacres were anything but unseen in Islamic history, but the magnitude and systematic character of those carried out by the conquering Mongol army was shocking even for historians. The descriptions of the events reflect a monumental case of collective post-traumatic stress disorder in history, and the reports affected – and were meant to affect – their contemporary and future readers. The accounts also show psychological responses to trauma. After such carnage, the instinct for survival and the drive for revival have to overcome the survivors’ feeling of guilt. They need to shape their own perception and memories8 in order to deal with the

8. The question of shaping memories was also in the focus of a study of the first volume of our series; see S. B. Savant, ‘Shaping Memory of the Conquests: The Case of Tustar’, in Violence in Islamic Thought from the Qur’an to the Mongols, eds R. Gleave and I. T. Kristó-Nagy (Edinburgh, 2015), pp. 70–89.
 unacceptable events. They have to make sense of the senseless death and life and rationalise what is beyond or below reason, but is emotionally unbearable.

The trauma was absurdly real. The behaviour of both Mongols and Muslims was, however, complex since the very start of their interaction, and textual sources show different and changing perceptions of the conquest and the Mongol rule. Michal Biran’s chapter (‘Violence and Non-Violence in the Mongol Conquest of Baghdad (1258)’) demonstrates that the conquest of Baghdad (656/1258), in spite of being a rather violent event, was less apocalyptic than as described in later sources, which mythicised it for their own ideological purposes. Collaboration between the conquerors and the vanquished was already present during the very days of the conquest of the city. As with the Arab-Muslim conquerors six centuries earlier, the Mongols also needed and made use of the expertise of the intelligentsia and of the service providers – including scholars and artists – of the vanquished; many of the latter were quite ready to serve the new rulers. Our sources were written by the literati, thus peasants – and common people in general – are rarely their focus, but the maintenance of control over them was a shared interest of both the old and new elites.

The acceptance of the victory of armies of Evil is not, however, easily accommodated in a religion based on the belief of the omnipotence of a just and good God. Their conquest and rule needed legitimisation, allowing Muslim subjects to accept them, and Muslim elites to join their rule. An alternative explanation was required in order to rationalise the situation, making it compatible with the idea of God’s justice and the practical fact of the Mongols’ lasting rule. The solution was the Sunnī adoption and adaptation of the idea that God’s punishment of unfaithful communities – which had been a fundamental theme

9. It was in fact a point of the criticism formulated by dualists against monotheism. We read this in Fragment XIX of a text refuting Islam attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (d. by 140/758 at the latest):

فصارت الغَلَبة للشَيطان بان تبِعه الخلائق على ضَلالته إلا أقلّھم

‘But the victory went to Satan, because the creatures followed him in his error with very few exceptions.’

of the Qur’an – could be inflicted on the Muslim umma as well, when it needed cleansing due to the sins of its members and leaders. The sinful of the community were conveniently identified with Muslim groups that rivalled or were opposed to that of the author of any such justification. The Mongols were seen as God’s tool and this promoted the interests of both the new rulers and their subjects looking for consolidation. Timothy May’s chapter (‘The Mongols as the Scourge of God in the Islamic World’) analyses the matching of interests and conceptual framework behind the depiction of the Mongols as the ‘Scourge of God’.

The focus of István Vásáry’s chapter (‘Yāsā and Sharī‘a: Islamic Attitudes towards the Mongol Law in the Turco-Mongolian World (from the Golden Horde to Timur’s Time’) is also on Islamic attitudes towards the violence of the Mongol conquerors. As the Mongols did not bring a new religion with universal proselytising ambition, eventually they converted to Islam. They brought, however, their law, the yāsā. Law (the sharī‘a) also played a central part in most trends of Islam, however, the ‘ulamā‘ (the ‘knowers’ of the sharī‘a) of the subjugated lands had no choice but to find a modus vivendi with the presence or indeed dominance of the Mongols’ non-Islamic yāsā. The chapter analyses how these two law systems, which were also ideologies, were able to co-exist in the Mongol states of the Golden Horde and Il-Khanid Iran, despite their antagonisms. Necessity knows no law; force teaches one to accept even two.

Beatrice Forbes Manz’ chapter (‘Unacceptable Violence as Legitimation in Mongol and Timurid Iran’) compares the accounts of the Mongol conquests by historians in the service of the consequently established Mongol rule, and reports by their counterparts working for the Mongols’ enemies. Interestingly, the pro-Mongol al-Juwaynī (d. 681/1283) describes the violence of the conquest at least as vividly as Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233), and al-Jūzjāni (d. after 664/1265) who both wrote for the anti-Mongol dynasties. The magnitude of the Mongols’ carnage served them not only as a deterrent from resistance to them, but its ‘supernatural’ character was used to demonstrate its divine character and, thus, paradoxically, provided legitimisation of their conquest. The underlying idea was that their bloodshed went beyond to be conceivable simply as a sin against God’s will; it could be only the proof of the Mongols being the instrument of God’s wrath, and – for those who had to accept their control – chosen by Him to rule. This successful model was intentionally imitated by Temür (Tamerlane) (d. 807/1405). In contrast with Chinggis Khan (d. 1227), Temür was, however, a Muslim, and justified his conquests by claiming to wage war for the faith and for protecting the sharī‘a. Consequently, pro-Timurid historians had make the dishonesty of his enemies and God’s will responsible for such massacres and destructions as that of Damascus and Baghdad, which were both former capitals of the caliphate. They also describe Temür as sparing the life
of scholars and craftsmen, but deporting them to where he needed them. He is not only presented as a destructor but as a constructor of the same superhuman magnificence. Meanwhile – similarly again to the case of the Mongol conquest – historians inimical to the Timurids presented Temür as a vicious and treacherous unbeliever, and emphasised atrocities his armies committed against the weak: women, elderly and children.

The fact that the Mongol conquerors were not Muslims presented a challenge to the Muslim elites, similar to that faced by the elites of defeated late antique empires after the Muslim conquest. In a monotheistic or dualistic framework, the invading enemy is logically identified with the forces of evil, as long as the resistance is meaningful. This was in fact the case of those Muslims who fought the Mongols, and perceived them as a lethal threat for Islam. Even after the Mongols’ conversion to Islam, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who lived under the rule of their Mamlūk rivals, maintained that they had to be fought. Fear and frustration tend to induce aggression. The fear from and hatred against the Mongols certainly played an important role in the more violent attitude of thinkers like Ibn Taymiyya against any ‘otherness’. Violence is more often countered by violence than anti-violence and, as it is demonstrated in Jon Hoover’s chapter (‘Reconciling Ibn Taymiyya’s Legitimatization of Violence with his Vision of Universal Salvation’), Ibn Taymiyya’s views on universal salvation were not at all in contradiction with his propagation of the use of legitimate violence.

As abusing adults have often a history as abused children, traumatised communities often inflict trauma on minorities under their dominance. Crisis fuels intolerance, and when establishments experience insecurity, minorities are commonly regarded as internal enemies and subjected to harsh treatment. This phenomenon is also recurrent in the history of Islam. Marie-Thérèse Urvoy’s chapter (‘Moral Violence in the Aḥkām al-Dhimma of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’) presents the brutally oppressive views of Ibn Taymiyya’s most famous pupil, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s (d. 751/1350), on the ways he thought Muslims had to deal with Christians. The treatment of non-Muslim enemies outside of the area under Muslim dominium unavoidably involves the much-discussed term jihād. In his chapter, Robert Gleave (‘Jihād, the State and Legitimate Violence in Imāmi Jurisprudence’) tests the extent to which a theory of jihād (as found in works of law) reflects the political context in which it was written (in this case, early Safavid Iran). The work of the most famous early Safavid jurist, ‘Alī al-Karakī (d.940/1534), who had strong ties to the early Safavid Shahs, actually held back on according them full legal legitimacy in their acts of conquest – they were not, in purely religious terms, acts of jihād, neither for him, nor for many Shi‘ī scholars who came after him.
Ibn Khaldūn (d. 784/1382) was a contemporary of the Mongol Sultan Temür (Timur), and the philosopher-historian-Mālikite scholar met the conqueror during the latter’s besiege of Damascus (803/1401). Ibn Khaldūn’s *al-Muqaddima (Introduction to History)* applies the methods of Islamised Greek philosophy on historiography. While philosophy does not always provide a natural focus in a study of violence, political philosophy is rich in theoretical explorations of violence. Miklós Maróth’s chapter (‘Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Arabic Political Philosophy: Al-Fārābī, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Khaldūn’) in this present volume compares Ibn Khaldūn’s views on violence with those of two earlier prominent figures in the history of Islamic and universal history: al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (d. 595/1198). All three thinkers agree that violence is part of nature, but it is legitimate only when it leads to the rule of the right religion. The chapter demonstrates the continuity of Islamic philosophy regarding violence, but also shows how key philosophers embedded similar thoughts in their different theories.

Political advice literature – a sort of ‘Political Philosophy for Rulers’ – was arguably one of the most pragmatic and transcivilisational segments of human culture. The European label for such works is ‘Mirrors for Princes’, but they were not all addressed to rulers, or to rulers only. Each such text is embedded in its cultural and historical context, and more or less infused with moral, religious, legal or philosophical elements, but their core concern is the nature and practice of power. Vasileios Syros’ chapter (‘“Soft” and “Hard” Power in Islamic Advice Literature’) centres on Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā’s *al-Fakhrī* (translated as: *On the Systems of Government and Muslim Dynasties*) written in 701/1302 Mosul. This text demonstrates well both the transcivilisational character of political advice literature, and the individual quality of the authors in applying age-old wisdom in a new situation. Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā’s thoughts echo former similar Islamic treatises, which were introduced into Islamic civilisation by such authors as Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d. by 140/758 at the latest), and were rooted in antique traditions that can be summarised as Indian, Iranian and Greek, but they can also be compared to ideas of Machiavelli (d. 1527), or recent theories such as Joseph Nye’s distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power. Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā’s main originality lies in his systematic use of history in illustrating his statements about rulership, and in his portrayal of the Mongols – recently converted to Islam – as the peak of the history of rulership. Success is the best legitimacy.

In the final section, representations of violence are explored in detail through two case studies: on Safavid Iran and Ottoman Turkey. Iván Szántó’s chapter (‘Old Images in New Skins: Flaying in the Iranian Visual Tradition’) deals with the portrayal of violence in visual images. Violent acts, in and of themselves, are instructive – they teach a lesson not only the victims, but to the wider world; and the message portrayed in these images concerns public order and the suppression of heresy. They can have a power beyond their immediate effects by being used to convey broader, almost ideological, messages. Combining pictorial and literary sources, starting from the Antiquity and reaching until the end of the pre-modern times, Szántó analyses the different legal, cultural and political contexts of a peculiar tradition centred in Iran. The object of this study is a demonstratively cruel way of execution, whose victims were flayed alive, and their skin was put on display (occasionally after being stuffed). Examples include a number of textual reports, as well as the depiction of the execution of Mānī the prophet of Manicheism (ca. 272–6 CE) in the Great Mongol Shāhnāma, dated to the 1330s CE, Gérard David’s oil painting The Judgment of Cambyses (1498) and The Flaying of a Polish woman in Isfahan, an engraving in Johann J. Straußens Reisen durch Griechenland, Moscau, Tarterey, Ostindien, und andere Theile der Welt (published in 1678). The use of such extreme violence in art conveys a particular message about the establishment and maintenance of public order. Finally, Colin Imber’s chapter (‘Warrant for Genocide? Ottoman Propaganda against the Qizilbash’) examines the Ottoman accusation of heresy against the Safavids, using the Qizilbash as a foil for their imperial enemies. The religious edicts (fatwās) analysed in Imber’s chapter demonstrate how description of heresy can act as a pretext for war, whether that war is classed as a jihād or merely as a means of punishing deviancy.

These last two chapters highlight then a theme that appears and reappears within this volume. The medieval Muslim intellectual milieu in which violence was discussed and processed aimed to overlay the physical and historical events with an understanding drawn from the rich reservoir of ideas and symbols explored in the first volume of our series.11 In that sense, the themes explored here are extensions of those already discussed there. Violence is somehow normalised by being worked into a world view – seen as an act of God, or an act of evil forces, justified for the elect, but unjustified when perpetrated by the deviants. In this, the theologians, artists and philosophers of this so-called Muslim

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‘middle’ period are quite typical; their sophistication and inventiveness when making sense of violent acts is at the same time unique and commonplace: unique in the sense that each historical manifestation is unlike any other, commonplace in that their depictions and judgements on violence are consonant with contemporary ideas elsewhere.

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Finally, we mention the sad passing of Professor Patricia Crone towards the end of the project – she had hoped to contribute to the projects in the early stages, but this soon proved impossible. Apart from her vast scholarly legacy, we remember her enthusiasm for all fields of enquiry, her encouragement of emerging scholars and her many individual acts of kindness. All this was combined with an unrelenting attention to scholarly standards. Her work for us, as for so many in the field of Islamic Studies, forms a fundamental component of our study.

RG and IKN
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