This book is a detailed study of the role that external military crises played in the development and growth of Japanese security policies in the period following the end of the Cold War. This evolution can be seen in the widened role of the Self-Defence Force (SDF) in shaping Japan’s security priorities, as well as its proactive contribution to regional and international security. Focusing on four key case studies – international peacekeeping in 1992, regional defence in 1997–99, global missions in 2003–05, and collective self-defence in 2014–15 – the author argues that the Japanese security policymaking elite achieved security policy expansion by utilizing external military crises as policy windows, inflating and deflating threat elements to circumvent the constraints and justify the implementation of security policy initiatives.
Chapter 1: A Case for Crisis in Japanese Security PolicymakingThe DebateA Case for External Military CrisesContributionStructure
Chapter 2: ‘Crisis is what a State Makes of it’Threat Construction ProcessCasesSources
Chapter 3: International Peacekeeping The CrisisThe ‘Crisis’ in the CrisisThreat ConstructionSecurity Policy Development
Chapter 4: Regional DefenceThe CrisesThe ‘Crisis’ in the CrisesThreat ConstructionSecurity Policy Development
Chapter 5: Global Missions The CrisisThe ‘Crisis’ in the CrisisThreat ConstructionSecurity Policy Development
Chapter 6: Collective Self-DefenceThe CrisisThe ‘Crisis’ in the CrisisThreat ConstructionSecurity Policy Development
Chapter 7: Summary, Implications and the US-China CompetitionImplications on Japanese Security Policy PracticeJapan and the US-China Competition
Bibliography
Bhubhindar Singh’s timely monograph is an important piece of scholarship and a welcome addition to the constructivist literature devoted to Japan’s foreign policy.