Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policymaking
Learning Lessons from an Era of Surprise
Edited by Christoph Meyer, Eva Michaels, Nikki Ikani, Aviva Guttmann, Michael S. Goodman
- Extensive empirical analysis of open-source material and interviews in relation to three cases of major surprise: Arab uprisings, ISIS’ rise to power in Syria and Iraq, and the Russian annexation of Crimea
- New theoretical insights into the causes of surprises and performance problems going beyond the debate about intelligence versus policy failures with contributions from former senior officials from the UK, Germany and the EU
- Identifies main causes of surprise among intelligence analysts and external experts challenging previous findings and accounts
This book provides the first assessment of the performance of three leading European polities in providing estimative intelligence during an era of surprise. It develops a new framework for conducting postmortems guided by a normative model of anticipatory foreign policy. The comparative analysis focuses on how the UK, the EU and Germany handled three cases of major surprises: the Arab uprisings, the rise to power of the Islamic State (ISIS), and the Russian annexation of Crimea. It considers not just government intelligence assessments, but also diplomatic reporting and expert open sources and how these assessments were received by organisational leaders. The book tests and develops new theories about the causes of strategic surprises, going beyond a common focus on intelligence versus policy failures to identify challenges and factors that cut across both communities. With the help of former senior officials, the book identifies lessons yet to be learnt by European polities to better anticipate and prepare for future surprises.
Acknowledgements
Introduction: Estimative Intelligence And Anticipatory Foreign Policy Guttmann, Ikani, Meyer & Michaels *
Chapter 1: Expectations From Estimative Intelligence & Anticipatory Foreign Policy Ikani, Meyer, Michaels & Guttmann *
Chapter 2: Surprise, Revisited: An Eu Performance Evaluation Of The Arab Uprisings Ikani *
Chapter 3: How Germany And The Uk Anticipated Isis’ Rise To Power In Syria And Iraq Guttmann & Micheals *
Chapter 4: The Ukraine-Russia Undeclared War 2013/2014: Lessons For The Eu’s Estimative Intelligence Meyer & Ikani *
Chapter 5: The Uk – Intelligence Assessment, Priorities And Knowing That You Are Being Warned Rimmer *
Chapter 6: "We Never Plan For The Worst Case" - Considering The Case Of Germany Schlie & Lutsch *
Chapter 7: Lessons Learned And Still To Be Learned: The Case Of The European Union Conrad *
Chapter 8: Which Lessons To Learn From An Era Of Surprise? Key Findings And Implications Meyer, Guttmann & Ikani *
Contributors *
This book, alongside the extensive research that underpins it, offers an array of noteworthy contributions that deserve attention. [...] In summary, Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policy provides a balanced and multifaceted perspective, making it a valuable resource for scholars, practitioners, and researchers interested in the intricate world of intelligence and its interplay with foreign policy.
Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policymaking is a welcome addition to the intelligence literature, and one that moves beyond state-on-state conflict to provide wider examples of regime change, internal stability, and hybrid threats.
In conclusion, Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policy is an empirical, theoretical and conceptual pillar for the discipline, in the European context and beyond. Rooted in the highest academic rigour and in methodologically sound research, this book is a fundamental read for scholars, practitioners, and decisionmakers of anticipatory foreign policy.
This book provides a holistic approach toward estimative intelligence and anticipatory foreign policy—another excellent contribution to the literature on intelligence.
This volume makes a unique empirical contribution to a less trodden yet increasingly critical subject of estimative intelligence in the European context. The contributors go beyond low hanging fruit of issues like cognitive bias to diagnose a broader complex suite of cultural, institutional, and professional factors at the heart of estimative intelligence failure. A must read for scholars, practitioners and policy makers interested in managing strategic surprise.
